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Taking Pedophilia Seriously
Margo Kaplan*
Abstract
This Article pushes lawmakers, courts, and scholars to
reexamine the concept of pedophilia in favor of a more thoughtful
and coherent approach. Legal scholarship lacks a thorough and
reasoned analysis of pedophilia. Its failure to carefully consider
how the law should conceptualize sexual attraction to children
undermines efforts to address the myriad of criminal, public
health, and other legal concerns pedophilia raises. The result is an
inconsistent mix of laws and policies based on dubious
presumptions. These laws also increase risk of sexual abuse by
isolating people living with pedophilia from treatment.
The Article makes two central arguments: (1) although
pedophilia does not fit neatly into any existing legal rubric, the
concept of mental disorder best addresses the issues pedophilia
raises; and (2) if the law conceptualizes pedophilia as a mental
disorder, we must carefully reconsider how several areas of law
address it. Specifically, it argues that sexually violent predator
statutes expand state power to civilly commit individuals by
distorting the concept of pedophilia as a mental disorder. At the
same time, anti-discrimination law is dismissive of pedophilia as
a mental disorder, excluding it from civil rights protections
ordinarily associated with mental illness. Closer examination of
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these distinctions reveals them to be based on questionable
premises.
The law should take pedophilia seriously as a mental
disorder. Many individuals living with pedophilia pose a danger
to others. Yet we should not categorically deny pedophilia the civil
rights protections afforded to other mental disorders without a
convincing normative justification supported by cogent scientific
evidence. Strengthening civil rights protections for those with
pedophilia also increases access to treatment and support that
helps prevent child abuse.
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I. Introduction
Ethan Edwards is a pedophile.1 He has also never touched a
child in a sexual manner and vows he never will.2 Edwards is one
of the two founders of “Virtuous Pedophiles,” a website dedicated
to supporting individuals with pedophilia who are morally
opposed to sexual contact with children.3 The site attempts to
reduce the stigma of pedophilia by demonstrating that it is an
unchosen sexual attraction and that many individuals with
pedophilia live law-abiding lives.4 A section called “Who We Are”
is full of testimonials from individuals living with pedophilia5
1. See
Who
We
Are,
VIRTUOUS
PEDOPHILES
(2012),
http://www.virped.org/index.php/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 27, 2015)
(introducing Ethan Edwards pseudonym for a man struggling with pedophilia)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The name “Ethan Edwards”
is a pseudonym.
2. Id.
3. Id.; Tracy Clark-Flory, Meet Pedophiles Who Mean Well, SALON, (June
30, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/07/01/meet_pedophiles_
who_mean_well/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (reporting on Virtuous Pedophiles)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Who We Are, supra note 1 (presenting testimonials from Virtuous
Pedophiles members); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (reporting on Virtuous
Pedophiles); Jennifer Bleyer, How Can We Stop Pedophiles, SLATE (Sept. 23,
2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_
examiner/2012/09/stop_childhood_sexual_abuse_how_to_treat_pedophilia_.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (relating the stories of several pedophiles and
examining the debate surrounding the treatment of pedophiles) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. Where possible, this Article uses the “people first” language preferred
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who oppose any sexual contact with children but have nowhere
else to turn for support.6 They live in fear of discovery, which
would result in loss of their jobs, friends, and community.7 Many
contemplate suicide.8
Pedophilia presents something of a paradox for the law.
Those who are sexually attracted to children are perhaps the
most reviled group in our society, regardless of whether they have
acted on their desires.9 Yet it is commonly presumed that such
in mental illness and disability law. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74
(1990) (endorsing individualized determinations of what handicapped
individuals are capable of doing rather than broad generalizations and fears); S.
REP. NO. 101-116, at 51 (1989) (stating preference for term “individual with
handicaps”); JOHN PARRY, REGULATION, LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO
IMPLEMENTATION, app. A (2d ed. 1996) (outlining key definitions and terms in
the field). This language refers to individuals first rather than their mental
illness or disability; for example, as “people living with schizophrenia” as
opposed to “schizophrenics.” See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74 (1990); S.
REP. NO. 101-116, at 51 (1989); JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER
1 (5th ed. 1995) (stressing the importance of language in disability law).
Because this Article discusses pedophilia as a mental disorder, it therefore uses
the term “people with pedophilia” or “people living with pedophilia” as opposed
to “pedophiles,” unless, as with Ethan Edwards, an individual chooses to
identify himself as “a pedophile.” Who We Are, supra note 1.
6. See Who We Are, supra note 1 (including introductory statements from
over seventy individuals and in-depth testimonials by others).
7. See Alice Dreger, What Can Be Done About Pedophilia?, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 26, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/08/
what-can-be-done-about-pedophilia/279024/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015)
(answering frequently asked questions about pedophilia treatment) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (describing the
struggles of an anonymous Virtuous Pedophiles member).
8. See Who We Are, supra note 1, (demonstrating that suicidal thoughts
are prevalent among pedophiles); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (same); Fred S.
Berlin & Edgar Krout, Pedophilia: Diagnostic Concepts Treatment, and Ethical
Considerations, in OUT OF HARM’S WAY: READINGS ON CHILD SEX ABUSE, ITS
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 155, 157 (Dawn C. Haden ed., 1986) (quoting a
man with pedophilia who admits thoughts about suicide).
9. See JESSE BERING, PERV: THE SEXUAL DEVIANT IN ALL OF US 156 (2013)
(explaining that men with pedophilia must live in a society that does not
understand or want to understand their condition); Jay R. Feierman, Human
Erotic Age Orientation: A Conclusion, in PEDOPHILIA: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 552,
553 (Jay R. Feierman ed., 1990) (noting that in Western society men with
pedophilia face “social ostracism, humiliation, and banishment”); Agustin
Malón, Pedophilia: A Diagnosis in Search of a Disorder, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 1083, 1094 (2012) (contending that pedophiles are the most feared
embodiment of perversion in modern society); Bleyer, supra note 4 (explaining
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individuals have a mental illness and cannot control their urges
or even their actions.10 The result is an often contradictory mix of
laws founded on questionable presumptions. These laws and
policies reflect little consideration of what pedophilia itself is and
how the law should treat it.
This Article pushes lawmakers, courts, and scholars to
reexamine how they understand and treat pedophilia in favor of a
more thoughtful and coherent approach. It places the law’s
treatment of pedophilia in the context of the debate over whether
pedophilia should be considered a mental disorder or whether it
is better conceptualized as a type of sexual orientation.11 This
Article argues that, although pedophilia does not fit neatly into
any existing legal rubric, the concept of mental disorder best
addresses the issues pedophilia raises.
The Article further argues that, if we are to conceptualize
pedophilia as a mental illness or disorder,12 we must rethink how
the law approaches it. Several areas of the law recognize
pedophilia as a mental disorder for the purposes of curtailing civil
rights but exclude it from civil rights protections associated with
mental disorders. Prosecutors and courts distort the concept of
pedophilia to justify civilly committing individuals as “sexually
violent predators” using far lower standards than ordinary civil
commitment proceedings.13 At the same time, anti-discrimination
that pedophiles are often viewed as “monsters” or “predators”); Clark-Flory,
supra note 3 (citing pedophilia expert James Cantor as estimating that
individuals with pedophilia may be the most isolated individuals in society).
10. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1092 (positing that pedophilia’s
classification as a mental illness seems to exacerbate ill will toward pedophiles
by increasing the perception that they are slaves to their urges and incapable of
controlling their behavior).
11. See infra Part II.A–B.
12. This Article often uses the terms “mental disorder” and “mental illness”
interchangeably. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual began using the term “disorder” in lieu of illness in its third
edition. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 5 (3d ed. 1980) (defining mental disorder as a basic concept);
Massimiliano Aragona, The Concept of Mental Disorder and the DSM-V, 2
DIALOGUES PHIL. MENTAL NEURO SCI. 1, 3 (2009) (outlining the history of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and the decision to adopt “disorder”). The two
terms have no specific set of criteria that distinguish them. Some associate
“illness” more with a biological basis than “disorder.” See id. (exploring the
nuances of the terms).
13. See infra Part III.B (examining pedophilia as a legal concept).
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law is dismissive of pedophilia as a mental disorder, excluding it
from civil rights protections ordinarily associated with mental
illness.14 Closer examination of these laws reveals them to be
based on questionable premises.
The law needs to take pedophilia seriously as a mental
disorder. While not every person living with pedophilia is
“virtuous,” the law should not categorically deny individuals with
pedophilia the civil rights protections afforded to those suffering
from other mental disorders without a strong normative
justification supported by cogent scientific evidence. Our current
treatment of pedophilia is inconsistent with important legal
principles underlying laws that protect the civil rights of those
with mental disorders. Moreover, the law takes an awkward and
incoherent approach because it confronts the issues pedophilia
raises only after it manifests in criminal behavior. This
squanders opportunities to treat pedophilia early, which experts
argue would improve treatment outcomes and prevent child
sexual abuse.15
This Article fills a gap in legal scholarship, which too often
elides the distinction between sexual attraction and the act of
child molestation, ignoring the many issues that pedophilia in
itself raises.16 Outside the context of sex offenders, pedophilia is
relegated to a counterexample or comparison for other topics,
demonstrating what something else is not.17 Yet legal scholarship
14. See infra Part IV.A (exploring the pedophilia exception to antidiscrimination laws).
15. See Gerard A. Schaefer et al., Potential and Dunkelfeld Offenders: Two
Neglected Target Groups for Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, 33 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 154, 154 (2010) (explaining that many potential child sex abusers
remain unknown until they offend and that this represents an undertreated
body of pedophiles).
16. See, e.g., Bhagwan A. Bahroo, Pedophilia: Psychiatric Insights, 41 FAM.
CT. REV. 497, 500 (2003) (discussing “[p]edophilia as a human behavior” and
focusing primarily on sex offenses).
17. See, e.g., Ann. E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1476–78 (2011) (distinguishing between polyamory and
pedophilia); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 846 (2002) (positing
that gays can distinguish themselves from those living with pedophilia); William
N. Eskridge Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 477 n.205 (2001) (distinguishing pedophilia from
homosexuality and disability); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional
Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1998) (distinguishing homosexuality from
“an uncontroversially reprobated horror, like pedophilia”).
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has failed to examine what pedophilia itself is and its legal
implications.18 It remains largely silent even as recent
breakthroughs in the neurology of pedophilia have brought mass
media attention to the social and policy issues pedophilia raises.19
This Article examines the difficulties in conceptualizing
18. There is significant scholarship on sex offenses and the punishment or
civil commitment of sex offenders, a subject different from an analysis of
pedophilia itself. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of
Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (2004) (discussing the criminal
law theory implications of detaining dangerous offenders); David J. Gottlieb,
Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1031 (2002) (arguing
that statutes that allow for civil commitment of sex offenders raise significant
constitutional problems); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social
Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular
Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69
(1996) (analyzing propriety of civil commitment for sex offenders); John A.
Fennel, Punishment By Another Name: The Inherent Overreaching in Sexually
Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
37 (2009) (examining the efficacy and basis for a Massachusetts civil
commitment statute); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003) (analyzing preventive detention of dangerous sex
offenders).
The limited legal scholarship on pedophilia focuses primarily on sex
offenses and civil commitment statutes but does not address the foundational
issue of how the law should conceptualize pedophilia in the first place. See
generally Bahroo, supra note 16; Andrea Friedman, Pedophilia: Laws Fighting
Nature Instead of Coping With It, 43 SW. L. REV. 253 (2013) (arguing for more
treatment of pedophiles and less stigmatization under the law); Melissa
Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental Disease, 33 PACE L. REV. 536
(2013) (discussing the consequences of paraphilia diagnoses for punishment and
civil commitment of sex offenders); Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment
Without Psychosis: The Law’s Reliance on the Weakest Link in Psychodiagnosis,
1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. & L. 17 (2005) (considering
psychiatric arguments that criticize civil commitment of sex offenders); Jennifer
Jason, Note, Beyond No Man’s Land: Psychiatry’s Imprecision Revealed By Its
Critique of SVP Statutes as Applied to Pedophilia, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1319 (2010)
(considering psychiatric arguments that critique Supreme Court decisions
allowing for civil commitment of pedophiles).
19. See Tarred and Feathered, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/522/tarred-and-feathered
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (examining the treatment of pedophiles by the public
and by medical professionals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (same); Casey Schwartz, What Science
Reveals
About
Pedophilia,
THE DAILY
BEAST
(Dec.
7,
2011),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/06/what-science-reveals-aboutpedophilia.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (reporting on recent coverage and
research of pedophilia as a mental disorder) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Bleyer, supra note 4 (same); Dreger, supra note 7 (same).
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pedophilia and proposes that current lawmakers, scholars, and
courts adopt a more reasoned approach to it.
Changing the law’s understanding of pedophilia has
substantial practical implications. Re-examining pedophilia is
necessary to create criminal and public health laws that
effectively prevent child sexual abuse. The current approach to
pedophilia denies individuals living with pedophilia critical civil
rights protections that would allow them to seek treatment,
maintain employment, and openly take part in society—all of
which would assist them in avoiding criminal behavior. These
laws may therefore have the inimical consequence of increasing
the risk of child sexual assault.20
But, while preventing child abuse is a substantial concern, it
is not the law’s only concern. Taking pedophilia seriously requires
us to take seriously the rights of people living with it. How the
law conceptualizes and treats pedophilia influences the ability of
those living with pedophilia to seek treatment, maintain
employment, and use public accommodations.21 For those who are
convicted or suspected of engaging in criminal activity, a
pedophilia diagnosis influences their sentence and whether they
will be deemed a “sexually violent predator” and detained
indefinitely.22 Failure to accurately conceptualize pedophilia
severely undermines the legitimacy of these laws and practices.
Diagnosing and treating pedophilia is also a significant public
health and legal concern. Researchers estimate that
approximately one percent of the male population—and an
unknown but presumably smaller percentage of the female
population—lives with pedophilia, putting its prevalence on par
with schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, and anorexia
nervosa.23
20. See infra Part III.A (examining the law’s treatment of pedophilia in
comparison with anti-discrimination statutes).
21. See infra Part III.A
22. See infra Part III.B (examining laws that provide for the civil
commitment of pedophiles).
23. See Wesley Stephenson, How Many Men Are Paedophiles?, BBC NEWS
(July 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28526106 (last visited Jan.
27, 2015) (discussing research by Seto and Contor on the prevalence of
pedophilia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael C. Seto,
Is Pedophilia a Sexual Orientation?, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 231, 232
(2012) (examining the prevalence of pedophilia in men); NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL
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The lack of legal scholarship examining the concept of
pedophilia reflects the discomfort that the topic instills.24 Sexual
attraction to children is, to most people, abhorrent and
disgusting.25 Individuals who sexually abuse children are
society’s most loathed criminals; those who feel sexual desire for
children therefore provoke disgust and suspicion.26 Any analysis
of expanding the rights of these individuals may seem like
sympathy for the devil, but the unease this topic provokes only
underscores the need for more thorough and dispassionate
analysis.27 Legal scholarship should not avoid thoughtful analysis
simply because it might lead to uncomfortable conclusions.
This Article does not dispute the very real harm of sexual
abuse or argue that pedophilic disorder should excuse criminal
behavior. Sex with children inflicts significant physical and
psychological harm.28 This Article does not seek to excuse this
HEALTH, THE NUMBERS COUNT: MENTAL DISORDERS IN AMERICA (2012) (reporting
estimated percentages of Americans with various mental disorders).
24. See Lea H. Studer & A. Scott Aylwin, Pedophilia: The Problem with
Diagnosis and Limitation of CBT in Treatment, 67 MED. HYPOTHESES 774, 774
(2006) (asserting that it is difficult to discuss pedophilia dispassionately because
of biological imperatives to protect children and the outrage that child sexual
exploitation generates).
25. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156 (contrasting pedophilia and other
types of paraphilia); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (describing how people with
pedophilia feel treated by society); Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (explaining that
people with pedophilia are often viewed as “monsters” or “predators”); Bleyer,
supra note 4 (same).
26. Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (explaining that people with pedophilia
are often viewed as “monsters” or “predators”); Bleyer, supra note 4 (same);
Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (same).
27. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 774 (stressing the need for
dispassionate discourse to resolve the problems pedophilia poses).
28. See Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia:
Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and
Forensic Issues, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 465 (2007) (outlining the effects of
sexual abuse on children); Peter J. Fagan et al., Pedophilia, 288 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2458, 2460 (2002) (explaining that sexually abused children are at higher
risk for mood and anxiety disorders, substance abuse, and suicide); Lillian
Southwick Bensley et al., Self-Reported Abuse History and Adolescent Problem
Behaviors, 24 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 163, 165–66 (1999) (examining
associations between child sexual abuse and antisocial and suicidal behaviors);
Heather Y. Swanston et al., Nine Years After Child Sexual Abuse, 27 J. CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 967, 968, 977–81 (2003) (reviewing previous studies and
presenting new statistical evidence of negative effects on child sex abuse
victims). Some researchers argue that child–adult sexual experience does not
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behavior; on the contrary, it holds those with pedophilia
responsible for their actions rather than dismissing them as
incorrigible monsters that lack the agency to control their
behavior. People with pedophilia remain responsible for their
acts; what they cannot control—and deserve no blame for—is
their desires.
Part
II
outlines
pedophilia’s
general
definition,
characteristics, causes, and treatments. It distinguishes common
myths from the realities of living with pedophilia. While the term
pedophilia is often used to refer to child sexual abuse, pedophilia
is in fact a status of being sexually attracted to prepubescent
children and not a behavior.29 This sexual attraction likely has a
biological cause beyond the control of the individual living with it.
Contrary to popular belief, many individuals living with
pedophilia believe that sex with children is wrong.30 The
enormous stigma of pedophilia, however, often isolates them from
support and treatment.31
Part III confronts the question of how the law should
conceptualize pedophilia. Sexologists, psychiatrists, and legal
scholars usually associate pedophilia with one of two categories:
(1) a mental disorder or (2) a form of sexual orientation called
inevitably result in psychological harm. See Zander, supra note 18, at 39
(outlining this research). However, even if this is true, the experience still
violates the child by overriding his or her ability to make reasoned choices about
sexual activity. Because children lack the capacity to make these choices, sexual
activity with them is a de facto violation and therefore a harm. See PETER
WESTON, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 116–17 (2004) (discussing the harm of statutory
rape); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 217 (2003) (explaining
that age is a proxy for psychological capacities that are relevant to the validity
of consent). Although the age at which an individual has the capacity to give
consent is subject to debate, see WERTHEIMER, supra, at 116–226 (engaging in
the debate), this Article presumes that prepubescent children lack sufficient
capacity.
29. See STEPHEN T. HOLMES & RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES: PATTERNS
AND BEHAVIORS 110 (3d ed. 2009); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 577–78
(discussing misuse of the term); Dreger, supra note 7 (same); David Goldberg, I,
Pedophile, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.the
atlantic.com/health/archive/2013/08/i-pedophile/278921/ (last visited Jan. 27,
2015) (relating that many men with pedophilia do not act on their attractions
beyond viewing child pornography) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
30. See Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (reporting on Virtuous Pedophiles).
31. Id.
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“erotic age orientation.” Part III.A describes the two views and
the conceptual problems pedophilia poses for each. Part III.B
argues that, for the purposes of legal analysis, pedophilia should
be considered a mental disorder and not a sexual orientation.
Laws that concern sexual orientation increasingly and justifiably
recognize the legitimacy and value of different types of
relationships and sexualities. Pedophilic desires are not in
themselves blameworthy, but they nonetheless involve sexual
interests that would harm others if acted upon. The legal rubric
of mental illness provides a more coherent fit for pedophilia and
is far better suited to address the legal concerns pedophilia
raises.
Part IV challenges the law’s current approach to pedophilia
in the context of civil rights protections and civil commitment. If
we are to take pedophilia seriously as a mental disorder,
lawmakers, courts, and scholars must reconsider how the law
addresses pedophilia in these contexts. Anti-discrimination laws
such as the Americans with Disabilities Act32 (ADA) define
disability to include mental disorders that impair major life
activities.33 Pedophilic disorder, however, is explicitly and
categorically excluded from ADA protection.34 Part IV.A argues
that there are good reasons to question the validity of this
exclusion, and that including pedophilic disorder from disability
protections afforded to other mental illnesses may be inconsistent
with the tenets of these laws and counterproductive to the goal of
preventing child abuse. It examines how existing ADA exceptions
such as the direct threat analysis can provide a robust response
to the potential public health and safety concerns that ADA
protection for pedophilia may raise. Part IV.B argues that
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) statutes expand state power to
civilly commit individuals with pedophilia based on a
questionable understanding of pedophilia as a mental disorder.
While there are valid concerns about many of these individuals’
propensity for criminal behavior, expanding state power to
preventively detain in this way is inconsistent with important
constitutional and criminal law principles.
32.
33.
34.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
Id. § 12102.
Id. § 12211.
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The Article concludes by considering the implications of the
Article’s analysis in other areas of law. Deeper analysis of
pedophilia also helps inform lawmaking concerning other sexual
interests, sexual orientations, and sexual disorders.
II. What Is Pedophilia?
A. Behavior vs. Status
Pedophilia is not the same as sexual abuse.35 Sexual abuse36
of a child is a criminal and morally reprehensible behavior.37 An
individual who sexually abuses a child makes a decision to act,
and that action harms a child.38 Pedophilia, in contrast, refers to
a type of sexual interest—specifically an intense and persistent
sexual interest in prepubescent children.39 Pedophilia need not
35. See MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST
CHILDREN 4 (2008) (introducing the distinction as a foundational concept);
Donald S. Strassberg et al., Psychopathy Among Pedophilic and Non-Pedophilic
Child Molesters, 36 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 379, 379 (2001) (examining
differences between sex offenders who are pedophilic and non-pedophilic);
Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 776 (explaining that common parlance and
many clinicians use the terms pedophile and child molester interchangeably);
Lisa J. Cohen & Igor I. Galynker, Clinical Features of Pedophilia and
Implications for Treatment, 8 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 276, 277 (2002) (same);
Hamilton, supra note 18, at 577–78 (same).
36. Though the legal definitions of the terms “sexual abuse” and “sexual
assault” vary by jurisdiction, this Article uses both phrases to refer to any
unlawful sexual interaction with a child. See Bahroo, supra note 16, at 499
(describing the different definitions).
37. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2364–
65 (1997) (distinguishing homosexuality from pedophilia on grounds that sexual
relationships with children are inherently exploitive).
38. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 465 (outlining effects of sexual abuse
on children); Fagan et al., supra note 28, at 2460 (same); Swanston et al., supra
note 28, at 968, 977–81 (same).
39. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 697 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] (outlining diagnostic
criteria for pedophilia); Anthony R. Beech & Leigh Harkins, DSM-IV
Paraphilia: Descriptions, Demographics, and Treatment Interventions, 17
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 527, 529 (2012) (describing various definitions of
pedophilia); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 157 (describing sexual desires of
people with pedophilia); Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 277 (same); SETO,
supra note 35, at 3 (same). Many variations exist within the broad category of
pedophilia. Some individuals are attracted exclusively to prepubescents while
others are also attracted to pubescent adolescents or adults. See SETO, supra
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entail any behavior; one may be a celibate pedophile, similar to
how one may have sexual desires for adults while remaining
celibate.
Just as not all pedophiles sexually abuse children, not all
sexual abuse of children is committed by pedophiles. Indeed, the
majority of child sex offenders do not have a strong or dominant
sexual interest in children.40 Child sexual abuse is commonly
motivated by other factors, such as power, control, or sense of
entitlement, and often occurs within the family.41
B. Characteristics, Causes, and Treatment
It is not unusual for children to experience “crushes”—
affection and attraction to other children. As most people age out
of childhood, so do the people to whom they are attracted. This
does not happen to people with pedophilia; they grow older but
remain attracted to children.42 Individuals often first notice their
pedophilic interest in adolescence.43
note 35, at 4 (differentiating between attraction to pre- and post-pubescent
children); Beech & Harkins supra, at 529 (same); Cohen & Galynker, supra note
35, at 280 (same); Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 459 (same). The age and the
sex of prepubescent children to which the individual is attracted may also vary.
There is some speculation that those attracted to infants is a variation of
pedophilia or should be categorized as its own unusual sexual interest. SETO,
supra note 35, at 4.
40. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (estimating that 25% to
40% of child sex offenders qualify for pedophilic disorder diagnosis).
41. See id. (noting that not all sexual abusers are people with pedophilia);
Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 777 (same); Alan Zarembo, Many
Researchers Taking a Different View of Pedophilia, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/14/local/la-me-pedophiles-20130115
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (tracing developments on the purported psychological
causes of pedophilia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See Ariadne Ellsworth, Pulling Pedophilia Out of the Dark, BROWN POL.
REV. (Apr. 26, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/04/pu
lling-pedophilia-out-of-the-dark/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (relating the story of
“Adam,” who realized as an adolescent that he was attracted to children) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Bleyer, supra note 4 (describing the
experience of “Spencer,” who noticed that, as he aged, the type of boy he was
attracted to did not age).
43. See Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 278 (noting that, while some
realize it earlier, many people with pedophilia become aware of their attraction
during adolescence); Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (providing that
50% of people with pedophilia develop interest by age fifteen); Studer & Aylwin,
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Though the exact prevalence of pedophilia in the population
is unknown, researchers estimate it at approximately one percent
of the male population,44 with a far smaller but unknown
prevalence among women.45 Interestingly, some attraction to
prepubescents seems even more common. Studies of sexual
arousal indicate that a surprising proportion of the population,
particularly among men, has fantasized about prepubescent
children during intercourse or masturbation or may become
aroused upon viewing images of prepubescents.46
The last few decades have seen increasing evidence that
pedophilia is biological and more specifically that it might be
neurological in origin.47 In studies with large sample sizes, sex
offenders diagnosed with pedophilia scored lower on intelligence
tests than non-pedophilic patients, with number of child victims
negatively correlating with intelligence while the number of adult
partners positively correlated with intelligence.48 Men with
pedophilia on average have poorer viseospatial and verbal
memory scores.49 Individuals with pedophilia have lower scores
supra note 24, at 775 (explaining that paraphilia often develops in adolescence);
Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 457 (same).
44. See Stephenson, supra note 23 (discussing research by Seto and
Cantor); SETO, supra note 35 (examining prevalence of pedophilia in men).
45. Studies of women have been largely limited to sex offenders, which
severely curtails the ability to make a calculation. See SETO, supra note 35, at 6–
8 (examining several studies and their statistical limitations); Cohen &
Galynker, supra note 35, at 277–78 (same); Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 524
(same); Schwartz, supra note 19 (reporting that women commit 6% of child sex
offenses).
46. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 775 (examining the prevalence
of pedophilia in men); SETO, supra note 35, at 7 (citing several studies). One
study found 62% of men had fantasized about young girls and 3% about young
boys, while another found that 9% had fantasized about sex with young
children, with 7% indicating some likelihood that they would have sex with a
child if they were guaranteed that they would not be identified or punished.
SETO, supra note 35, at 7.
47. See SETO, supra note 35, at 108–11 (discussing neuroscientific study in
this area).
48. Id. at 109.
49. See James M. Cantor et al., Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in
Pedophilic Men, 42 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 167, 167–68, 177 (2008) (discussing the
phenomena and showing visual examples); James M. Cantor et al., Intelligence,
Memory, and Handedness in Pedophilia, 18 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 3, 11 (2004)
(examining these conclusions).
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for semantic knowledge and lower executive functioning levels.50
They are also three times more likely to be left-handed or
ambidextrous, strongly suggesting a neurological cause.51 Some
findings suggest that disturbances to neurodevelopment in utero
or in early childhood increase risk of pedophilia.52 Sex offenders
with pedophilia are also more likely to report experiencing head
injuries, a possible source of brain damage, before age thirteen.53
Brain imaging also evidences a neurological cause. MRIs
reveal that sex offenders with pedophilia have less white matter
in their brains than individuals who have committed no offenses
against children.54 White matter serves as a pathway in the
brain’s network, connecting various grey matter areas to each
other and carrying nerve impulse between neurons.55 Researchers
speculate that pedophilia could result from improper connections
in the brain, most notably in a network that identifies whether
environmental stimuli are sexual.56 The brain of an individual
50. See Yana Suchy et al., Neurocognitive Differences Between Pedophilic
and Nonpedophilic Child Molesters, 15 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 248,
252–55 (2007) (reaching these conclusions with statistical analyses).
51. See Cantor et al., Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men,
supra note 49 (discussing the phenomena); Cantor et al., Intelligence, Memory,
and Handedness in Pedophilia, supra note 49 (examining these conclusions);
James M. Cantor et al., Quantitative Reanalysis of Aggregate Data on IQ in
Sexual Offenders, 131 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 555, 559–62 (2005) (demonstrating
these statistical relationships); see also Jadranka Bacic, MRIs Link Pedophilia
to Early Brain Development, 5 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRY AUJOURD’HUI 6 (June 2009)
(reporting on a study involving brains of one thousand people with pedophilia).
52. See Cantor, et al., Quantitative Reanalysis of Aggregate Data on IQ in
Sexual Offenses, supra note 51, at 565 (suggesting this conclusion as the cause
of both low IQ and pedophilic interests).
53. See Ray Blanchard et al., Retrospective Self-Reports of Childhood
Accidents Causing Unconsciousness in Phallometrically Diagnosed Pedophiles,
31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 511, 523 (2003) (reaching this conclusion based on
statistical analysis); SETO, supra note 35, at 109 (same).
54. Cantor et al., Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men,
supra note 49, at 180.
55. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (explaining that white matter is the
substance that connects brain regions to each other); see also Cantor et al.,
Cerebral White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men, supra note 49, at 180
(describing the results of a neuroscience study and postulating that low white
matter volumes increase the risk of developing pedophilia); Dreger, supra note 7
(“In studies, pedophiles show signs that their sexual interests are related to
brain structure and that at least some differences existed in their brains before
birth.”).
56. See Bacic, supra note 51 (discussing neuroscience research that
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with pedophilia may interpret stimuli that usually elicit a
nurturing and protective response as sexual instead.57
Psychiatric research calls into question many assumptions
about the minds of individuals with pedophilia. Contrary to
common beliefs, individuals living with pedophilic disorder are
unlikely to have antisocial personality disorder; recent studies
have demonstrated that sex offenders diagnosed with pedophilic
disorder score significantly lower on indicators of antisocial
personality disorder than either non-pedophilic child molesters or
control groups of non-sex offending criminals.58 Though studies
are often limited to convicted sex offenders with pedophilia and
exclude those who do not offend,59 this limitation seems more
likely to inflate rather than reduce findings of antisocial
personality disorder. Individuals with pedophilia do experience
higher rates of mental disorders, most commonly mood and
anxiety disorders and, in particular, major depression and social
phobia.60
suggests the brains of people with pedophilia have problems with the circuitry
that connects sexually responsive parts of the brain); Cantor et al., Cerebral
White Matter Deficiencies in Pedophilic Men, supra note 49, at 180 (providing an
explanation for why low white matter volumes may increase the risk of
pedophilia); Dreger, supra note 7 (“The best current evidence suggests that
pedophilia results from atypical wiring in the brain.”).
57. See Dreger, supra note 7 (noting that brains of those living with
pedophilia may have “what could be considered a ‘cross-wiring’ in the brain
anatomy that is responsible for controlling natural social instincts or behavior”);
Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing the brain’s network for detecting sexual
objects in the environment and theorizing that abnormal functioning in the
brains of people with pedophilia causes children to provoke an erotic response
rather than the urge to nurture or protect).
58. See Strassberg et al., supra note 35, at 380–81 (explaining the results of
a study that showed that pedophilic child molesters are significantly less likely
to have a psychopathic personality than non-pedophilic child molesters).
59. See, e.g., Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 775 (“As pedophiles
typically do not identify themselves as such, studies on virtually every aspect of
pedophilia use convicted sex offenders as the sample pool, and crime statistics
as a data source.”); Nancy C. Raymond et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity Among
Pedophilic Sex Offenders, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 786, 786 (1999) (noting every
participant in the study except one was a sex offender that was court ordered to
participate in treatment programs); Strassberg et al., supra note 35 (noting that
the sample included men who were convicted of a sexual offense against a child
less than fourteen years old).
60. See Raymond et al., supra note 59, at 786–87 (discussing the prevalence
of various mood disorders among individuals with pedophilia).
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The role of impulsivity in pedophilia and pedophilic behavior
is also subject to debate. It is commonly assumed that individuals
living with pedophilia simply “can’t help themselves” and are
unable to control their impulses to molest children.61 Yet
individuals with pedophilia rarely spontaneously molest children,
and the vast majority of sexual abuse of children is
premeditated.62 A recent study found no connection between
pedophilia and impulse-aggressive traits and in fact found more
evidence of inhibition, passive-aggression, and harm avoidance.63
Similarly, MRI studies have found no evidence to suggest any
differences in the parts of the brain that relate to self-control or
impulsivity.64
Attitudes toward sexual abuse of children vary among
individuals living with pedophilia. Among those who offend, some
individuals attempt to justify child sexual abuse, absolving
themselves of guilt and responsibility by minimizing the harm to
the child.65 In contrast, some offenders are relieved to be
61. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 462 (noting that, although people
with pedophilia often report difficulty controlling their behavior, it is rare for
them to spontaneously molest a child); Six Misconceptions About Pedophiles,
DISCOVERY
NEWS
(Nov.
18,
2011,
3:00
AM),
http://news.
discovery.com/human/psychology/misconceptions-pedophilia-111118.htm
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (dispelling the misconception that people with pedophilia
cannot help attempting to molest a child whenever the opportunity arises) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 462 (arguing that, because 70% to
80% of sex offenses against children are premeditated, the notion that people
with pedophilia lack self-control is untenable).
63. Lisa J. Cohen et al., Impulsive Personality Traits in Male Pedophiles
Versus Healthy Controls: Is Pedophilia an Impulsive-Aggressive Disorder?, 43
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 127, 132–33 (2002). These researchers proposed
that pedophilia may be compulsive rather than impulsive—that is, driven by the
desire to avoid harm and relieve negative feelings rather than to gain pleasure
and positive feelings. Id. at 127, 132–33. The research on this is limited,
however, by the fact that it targets sex offenders with pedophilia, excluding nonoffenders. Id. at 129.
64. James M. Cantor, Understanding MRI Research on Pedophilia,
http://individual.Utoronto.ca/james_cantor/blog2.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See Fagan et al., supra note 28, at 2460 (noting that many people with
pedophilia exhibit cognitive distortions, such as a belief that the child was not
harmed by abuse); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 156–57 (contrasting people
with pedophilia who feel ashamed of their attraction to children with people
with pedophilia who are not bothered by their sexual interest in children);
Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 279, 282 (stating that people with
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apprehended and hope that treatment will help them correct
their behavior.66 Others, like those on the site Virtuous
Pedophiles, have never offended.67 Virtuous Pedophiles
adamantly opposes any sexual contact with children.68 While
there is no research on the prevalence of attitudes among people
living with pedophilia, some experts who work with people with
pedophilia insist that those who embrace their desires are in the
minority.69 Among those who wish to avoid sexual contact with
children, some have no trouble resisting while others require
professional help.70
Current psychological consensus is that pedophilia is
amenable to appropriate treatment in many circumstances.71
Treatment cannot convert sexual interests; therapy to redirect
sexual attraction away from children toward adults has fared no

pedophilia “routinely deny and minimize the deviant nature of their behavior
and its destructive impact on children involved”); Schwartz, supra note 19
(discussing the feelings of denial people with pedophilia may experience).
66. Fagan et al., supra note 28, at 2460.
67. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, 156–57 (noting that some people with
pedophilia find it easy to resist sexually abusing children); VIRTUOUS
PEDOPHILES, http://www.virped.org/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (listing goals of
the organization, which include informing the public that a substantial number
of people living with pedophilia do not molest children) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Dreger, supra note 7 (“Not every person who
experiences sexual attractions to children acts on those attractions.”); ClarkFlory, supra note 3 (discussing people with pedophilia that have never abused
children).
68. F.A.Q., VIRTUOUS PEDOPHILES, http://www.virped.org/index.php/f-a-q
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (noting that some people with pedophilia
believe society should not insist that they refrain from acting on their
attractions, but that this view is expressed by a minority of people with
pedophilia).
70. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 3 (comparing people with
pedophilia that have difficulty resisting temptation and need professional help
with people with pedophilia that find it easy to resist acting on their attraction
to children).
71. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 534 (discussing various
psychological studies that show people with pedophilia are less likely to abuse
children when treated); Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 286 (listing
predictors of treatment outcomes, which include whether the individual knew
his victims, the number of victims, and whether the abuse occurred inside the
home); Bleyer, supra note 4 (describing successful treatment using therapies
similar to those for addiction).
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better with pedophilia than it has with same-sex attraction.72
Instead, successful treatment has focused on cognitive-behavioral
therapy, often in combination with medication that reduces
overall sexual desire.73 Some treatments have integrated models
used for addiction therapy.74
One shortcoming in the research on treatment is that it
usually focuses on individuals who have committed sexual
offenses, with little attention given to the treatment of nonoffending individuals living with pedophilic disorder.75 The lack of
research and large-scale treatment programs for those outside
the criminal justice system is a source of frustration among nonoffenders, with some forming their own support groups to fill the
gap.76
A relatively new German project seeks to address these
problems by providing confidential and free treatment for both
offending and non-offending individuals. Prevention Project
Dunkelfeld (PPD) offers treatment and support to individuals

72. See SETO, supra note 35, at 175–76 (discussing the efficacy of therapy
aimed at changing a pedophile’s interest in children and noting that it is unclear
whether the therapy results in actual changes in interest or greater control over
pedophilic sexual arousal); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 164 (explaining
that, although therapy attempting to replace the erotic feelings of people living
with pedophilia about children with age-appropriate stimuli achieved some
success, “it has not been well established that such changes carry over into the
non-laboratory situation”); Dreger, supra note 7 (“We have not yet found a way
to convert pedophiles into non-pedophiles that is any more effective than the
many failed attempts to convert gay men and lesbians into heterosexuals.”).
73. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 534 (discussing various
psychological studies that show that therapy and medication has reduced
recidivism by sexual offenders); SETO, supra note 35, at 171–76 (providing an
overview of various types of treatments for pedophilia and noting a study
showing that cognitive-behavioral therapy resulted in a significant decrease in
recidivism among sex offenders); Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing the use of
medication that lowers testosterone levels and psychotherapy that involves
cognitive behavioral methods).
74. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 533 (discussing Relapse
Prevention).
75. See id. at 534 (explaining that many more studies have examined
treatment for sex offenders rather than pedophilia); Cohen & Galynker, supra
note 35, at 286 (discussing treatment outcomes only among sex offenders).
76. See Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (describing support groups formed by
people with pedophilia who have never offended); Bleyer, supra note 4
(discussing the difficulty in finding appropriate therapy).
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sexually attracted to children to prevent sexual offenses.77 It
employs a public outreach campaign—using billboards, print,
television, and online advertising—to send three messages to
individuals living with pedophilic disorder: (1) you are not to
blame for your sexual attraction; (2) you are responsible for your
actions; and (3) help is available.78
PPD’s treatment focuses on preventing individuals from both
physically abusing children and using child pornography.79 It
uses both behavioral therapy and, in some circumstances,
pharmaceutical interventions.80 The therapy focuses on helping
patients learn “an appropriate perception and appraisal of their
sexual wishes and needs,” “the identification of and coping with
dangerous developments,” and “strategies for the prevention of

77. See M. Beier et al., Encouraging Self-Identified Pedophiles and
Hebephiles to Seek Professional Help: First Results of the Prevention Project
Dunkelfeld (PPD), 33 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 545, 545 (2009) (introducing the
project and describing the international concern about child sexual exploitation);
Project, PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD, https://www.dont-offend.org/story
/78/3878.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (describing the project as a way for
people with pedophilia to obtain confidential treatment) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); D. RICHARD LAWS & TONY WARD, DESISTANCE
FROM SEX OFFENDING: ALTERNATIVES TO THROWING AWAY THE KEYS 159–60 (2011)
(discussing the project and its approaches to prevent child abuse by people with
pedophilia).
78. See LAWS & WARD, supra note 77 (stating the slogan of the media
campaign: “You are not guilty because of your desire, but you are responsible for
your sexual behavior. There is help! Don’t become an offender!”); Beier et al.,
supra note 77, at 546 (describing the media campaign and the research that
supported choosing these three messages); Media Work, PREVENTION PROJECT
DUNKELFELD, https://www.dont-offend.org/story/84/3884.html (last visited Jan.
27, 2015) (explaining the goals of the media campaign) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); GEROLD SCHERNER & LAURA KUHLE, INSIGHTS
OF THE PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD (Apr. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.slideshare.net/Sexpo/gerold-scherner-insights-of-the-preventiveproject-dunkelfeld (discussing the need to dispel stigma about pedophilia and
using the media campaign to further this goal).
79. See Beier et al., supra note 77, at 548 (noting that a substantial portion
of the sample committed child sexual exploitation through child pornography
and discussing the approach for prevention analyzed by the study).
80. See Therapy, PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD, http://www.dontoffend.org/story/85/3885.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (“The therapeutic
procedure integrates behavioural therapy and sexological approaches and also
includes the option for pharmaceutical support.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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sexual assault.”81 It is provided in both group and individual
settings and may include family members.82
PPD has not yet published treatment results indicating
whether it has been successful in reducing or preventing offenses.
However, preliminary results indicate that individuals who
undergo treatment emerge with a balance of characteristics that
makes them less likely to offend, particularly among those who
have a history of offending.83 For example, treatment resulted in
more negative attitudes toward offending, greater victim
empathy, less emotional loneliness and hostility, and better
sexual coping skills.84
C. Living with Pedophilia
Individuals who have sexual interest in children usually live
closeted lives.85 It is commonly assumed that such people do not
self-identify to more successfully victimize children.86 For some,
this is the case.87 But for those who do not abuse children, the
closet is both a refuge from societal condemnation and a source of
profound isolation. Experts and individuals living with pedophilia
agree that isolation and lack of support is a serious obstacle for
the prevention of sexual abuse.88 Dr. James Cantor, one of the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See SCHERNER & KUHLE, supra note 78 (discussing results that show
both child sex abusers and users of child pornography had less offensesupportive attitudes after treatment). See generally Zarembo, supra note 41.
84. See SCHERNER & KUHLE, supra note 78 (explaining the results of
treatment for offenders that both sexually abused children and viewed child
pornography and noting improvement in these four areas).
85. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156–57 (discussing the extreme personal
distress experienced by people with pedophilia because of the need to hide a
fundamental aspect of their identity).
86. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, In Plain View, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 24,
2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/24/in-plain-view
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (“A pedophile . . . is someone adept not just at preying on
children but at confusing, deceiving, and charming the adults responsible for
those children.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See id. (describing some pedophilic child molesters’ process of becoming
integrated in a community to earn trust).
88. See Dreger, supra note 7 (noting that many people with pedophilia
stopped attending therapy because mandatory reporting laws may require their
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foremost researchers on pedophilia, has argued that individuals
living with pedophilia are more likely to offend when they have
no support, noting “[p]eople are most likely to do the most
desperate things when they feel the most desperate.”89
Pedophilia is the most shameful and feared of all unusual
sexual interests.90 Individuals living with pedophilia exist in a
society that not only does not understand their sexual interests
but does not want to.91 Psychologist Jesse Bering analogizes an
individual with pedophilia to a straight person in a witness
protection program that assigns him a gay identity:
[Y]ou must convince everyone you meet, for your own safety
and for the safety of those you care about, that you’re 100
percent homosexual. Now don’t try too hard to appear gay,
because you’ll give yourself away, so be stereotypical but not
too stereotypical, yet don’t ever let your guard down
either . . . . Watch what you say, where your eyes go, what you
do in your spare time, whom you’re seen with, and careful
now, no matter how close you get to someone in this new life of
yours, no one must ever discover that you’re really a
heterosexual. All that you hold dear—and I can’t emphasize
this part enough—hangs in the balance.92

Comments on the Virtuous Pedophiles website describe
similar feelings of fear and isolation:

therapist to report them to authorities, which leaves people with pedophilia
with no support from mental health professionals); Clark-Flory, supra note 3
(providing an example of a pedophile who has never abused children and started
an anonymous support group to help people with pedophilia resist abusing
children).
89. Dreger, supra note 7.
90. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156–57 (explaining that people with
pedophilia face a lifetime of defending, rationalizing, or hiding their sexual
interests because of society’s shame and fear of their sexual interest in
children); Malón, supra note 9 (stating that people with pedophilia are the most
feared embodiment of perversion in modern society); Bleyer, supra note 4
(illustrating a pedophile’s struggle for acceptance and noting the moment he
realized that what felt entirely natural to him was despised by society); ClarkFlory, supra note 3 (citing pedophilia expert James Cantor as estimating that
individuals with pedophilia may be the most isolated individuals in society).
91. See BERING, supra note 9 (explaining the personal distress people with
pedophilia experience because of society’s refusal to try to understand
pedophilia).
92. Id. at 156–57.
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The only thing keeping me from suicide is knowing my family
and friends would be devastated. . . . I also wonder how many
would still care if they knew how I felt about boys.
***
I have a paralyzing fear of being outed as a pedophile (even
though I haven’t done anything illegal, the social stigma would
destroy what little social and family life I have.)
***
I don’t think I can ever tell anybody in my family, as I’m too
worried that if people know it will prevent me from growing up
to have a successful job or do well in my final years of high
school. It’s such a sensitive topic, and so many people think
that pedophilia is one of the worst crimes in the world, even
above murder. But I have not offended, and I wish not to.
***
I felt like I could never talk about it to anyone and I could talk
about other things but never really the true problem. I’ve had
suicidal thoughts for a long time. I just want to talk to
someone who understands without fear, I don’t know what else
to do.93

The artifice is exhausting and yet the repercussions of being
outed may be worse. When a U.K. news source began a project of
naming suspected pedophiles, residents throughout the country
reacted violently to the idea of such individuals living in their
communities.94 Riots erupted in which police came under fire;
93.
94.

Who We Are, supra note 1.
See Rebecca Allison, Doctor Driven Out of Home By Vigilantes, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2000, 19:42 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/aug
/30/childprotection.society (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (“Dr. Cloete is the latest
victim to have been wrongly identified by anti-paedophile campaigners in the
wave of protests which have swept the country following the News of the
World’s campaign to ‘name and shame’ alleged sex offenders.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Nicole Martin, Innocent Families Driven Out
as Paedophile Protest Continues, THE TELEGRAPH, (Aug. 10, 2000),
http://www.telegraph.co.ul/news/uknews/1352121/Innocent-families-driven-outas-paedophile-protest-continues.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (describing a
mob of 300 people that gathered outside a suspected pedophile’s home and
screamed “hang him”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Families Flee Paedophile Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2000, 11:14 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/872436.stm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015)
(discussing the need to rehouse some residents because of the violence) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It is unclear whether the news
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cars were burned, and windows smashed.95 Mobs targeted and
attacked those suspected of pedophilia.96 The government was
forced to relocate several families, and one man killed himself
after a vigilante attack on his home left him in fear for his life.97
Even a pediatrician was forced to flee her home after vandals
mistook her title for the word “pedophile.”98 As Bering notes,
people living with pedophilia, “aren’t living their lives in the
closet; they’re eternally hunkered down in a panic room and
chewing away nervously at their nails.”99
III. Reconceptualizing Pedophilia in the Law
This Part analyzes the different ways of conceptualizing
pedophilia in the law. Part III.A explores pedophilia as a mental
disorder and as a sexual orientation, and discusses the problems
each concept raises. Part III.B posits that the legal concept of
sexual orientation is a poor fit for pedophilia because pedophilic
sexual interests are defined by intense and recurrent desires to
engage in conduct that significantly harms others. It argues that
the legal concept of mental illness far better addresses the issues
pedophilia raises.

reports are using “pedophile” mistakenly to refer to child molesters rather than
people living with pedophilia. However, the conflation of these categories in the
public mind makes the distinction largely irrelevant in this context—either is
likely to produce significant hostile reactions.
95. Families Flee Paedophile Protests, supra note 94 (“Protests have
escalated from peaceful demonstrations into riots with police coming under fire,
cars being burned and windows smashed.”).
96. See id. (describing the mob violence against people suspected to have
pedophilia).
97. Id.
98. See Allison, supra note 94 (“Self-styled vigilantes attacked the home of
a hospital pediatrician after apparently confusing her professional title with the
word ‘paedophile.’”).
99. BERING, supra note 9.
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A. Pedophilia as Mental Disorder or Sexual Orientation
1. Pedophilic Disorder
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) recognizes a
mental disorder characterized by sexual attraction to children,
which it terms “pedophilic disorder.”100 Pedophilic disorder is part
of a subset of mental disorders known as “paraphilic disorders,”
named so because each involves an unusual sexual interest called
a “paraphilia.”101
The APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM), the “bible” of modern psychiatry,102 outlines
three diagnostic criteria for pedophilic disorder.103 Criterion A
requires recurrent, intense sexual interest in a prepubescent
child or children that lasts for at least six months.104 The DSM
defines prepubescence as “generally age thirteen years or
younger,”105 however it is more reliable to use indicators of

100. The APA only recently changed the name of this disorder from
pedophilia to pedophilic disorder. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PEDOPHILIC DISORDERS
(2013). Much of the research on pedophilic disorder therefore refers to it as
pedophilia. This change reflects the APA’s distinction between a paraphilic
disorder and its underlying paraphilia.
101. Paraphilias can vary significantly in the type of interest at issue. Some
concern erotic activities (masochistic disorder involves sexual interest in being
made to suffer), whereas others concern the individual’s erotic targets
(pedophilic disorder involves sexual interest in prepubescent individuals). See
DSM-V, supra note 39, at 685, 694, 697 (describing different types of paraphilic
disorders).
102. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (noting that the description of the
DSM as a psychiatric bible is not a mere play on words given the normative
status it has acquired in our society); Gary Greenberg, The Cult of DSM,
PSYCHOTHERAPY NETWORKER, Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 21 (criticizing the power the
DSM has over the psychiatric community).
103. The DSM did not make this formal distinction between “paraphilia”
and “paraphilic disorder” until the recent DSM-V. The disorder itself was once
called a paraphilia; now paraphilias are not disorders, but rather Criterion A of
paraphilic disorders. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 685–86, 816 (explaining the
change in terminology from DSM-IV to DSM-V). This distinction did not change
how paraphilic disorders are diagnosed; it simply changed how we referred to
them. Id.
104. See id. at 697–98 (providing the definition of Criterion A and describing
the diagnostic features of pedophilic disorder).
105. See id. (defining prepubescence).
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puberty rather than age.106 Criterion B is fulfilled if the
individual acts on the urges or if the individual’s urges or
fantasies cause “marked distress or interpersonal difficulty.”107
Sexual interest is therefore necessary but not sufficient for a
diagnosis; it must be accompanied by some behavior, distress, or
interpersonal impairment. Criterion C specifies that clinicians
should exclude from a pedophilic disorder diagnosis an individual
under age sixteen as well as an individual in late adolescence
involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with a twelve- or
thirteen-year-old.108
Classifying pedophilia as a mental disorder raises the thorny
question of how to distinguish which sexual desires indicate
mental illness rather than typical variations in sexuality.109 One
reason this is so difficult is that it relies on a coherent concept of
mental illness.110 While there is no universally accepted definition

106. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 560 (explaining that secondary sex
characteristics associated with puberty may be present before age thirteen and
noting criticism of the DSM’s definition of pedophilic disorder for this reason).
Thomas K. Zander argues that this method raises problems because the onset of
puberty is not a clear line, allowing determinations to “literally devolve into a
splitting of pubic hairs.” Thomas K. Zander, Adult Sexual Attraction to EarlyStage Adolescents: Phallometry Doesn’t Equal Pathology, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 329, 329 (2009).
107. DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697. All other paraphilic disorders listed in
the DSM-V require “clinically significant distress” or “impairment” in “social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.” See id. at 686, 689, 691,
694, 695, 700, 702 (providing the definitions of the other paraphilic disorders:
voyeuristic disorder, exhibitionistic disorder, frotteuristic disorder, sexual
masochism disorder, sexual sadism disorder, fetishistic disorder, and transvestic
disorder).
108. See id. at 697 (providing the definition of Criterion C).
109. See, e.g., Fred S. Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?,
31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 479, 479 (2002) (discussing the inevitable value
judgments required to label a condition as a mental disorder) [hereinafter
Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?]; Hamilton, supra note 18,
at 556–59 (explaining that because pedophilia is a type of mental disorder
characterized by psychosexual interest in unusual objects, its characterization
as a mental disorder inherently involves a normative inquiry).
110. See Charles Moser, Paraphilia: A Critique of a Confused Concept, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SEX THERAPY: INNOVATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 91, 93–96
(Peggy J. Kleinplatz ed., 2001) (noting the influence of medicine, religion, law,
science, society, and culture on the definition of mental disorders and discussing
the difficultly of defining mental disorders); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 556–59
(explaining that even within the same timeframe and cultural base there is no
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of or test for mental illness,111 working definitions possess
common traits. Most notable among these is the idea of the
mental dysfunction,112 specifically a disturbance in an
individual’s ability to think, feel, or relate to others.113 Mental
consensus about what is normal and abnormal, which renders classification of
behavior as a mental disorder controversial).
111. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 182–98 (1984) (describing
various ways to define mental illness); Allen Frances et al., Defining Mental
Disorder When It Really Counts: DSM-IV-TR and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 375, 378 (2008) (noting that even the DSM-IV-TR
states that it cannot provide a precise definition of a mental disorder); Jane
Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585,
593–97 (2002) (describing the difficulty of defining a mental disorder); Aragona,
supra note 12, at 1–2 (stating that whether disorder is a scientific biomedical
term or a sociopolitical term that necessarily involves a value judgment is a
“fundamental philosophical problem underlying discussions on diagnostic
systems”); Jerome C. Wakefield, The Concept of Mental Disorder: Diagnostic
Implications of the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis, 6 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 149,
150 (2007) (noting tests that distinguish disorders from nondisorders rely on
implicit assumptions about the concept of disorder).
112. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 193 (analyzing whether the outcome of a
particular condition or process defines its function, which allows assessment of
dysfunction based on deviation from a condition’s function); Korn supra note
111, at 593–95 (discussing the role of mental dysfunction in defining a mental
disorder); Wakefield, supra note 111, at 151–52 (distinguishing mental disorders
from other negative mental conditions by arguing that mental disorders entail
dysfunction); Aragona, supra note 12, at 5–13 (critiquing the argument that
dysfunctions are purely factual, rather than containing a normative element);
Fred S. Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, 39 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW. 242, 242 (2011) [hereinafter Berlin, Commentary
on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5] (describing the criteria of a
pedophilia diagnosis and arguing that individuals who have sexual urges in
response to children, regardless of the intensity of the urges, should qualify for a
pedophilia diagnosis). The DSM-V describes mental illness as a syndrome
characterized by (1) clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s
cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that (2) reflects a dysfunction in the
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental
functioning. DSM-V, supra note 39, at 20.
113. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 20 (using the concept of dysfunction to
define mental disorder); Aragona, supra note 12, at 5–13 (critiquing the
argument that dysfunctions are purely factual, rather than containing a
normative element); Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in
DSM-5, supra note 112, at 242 (describing the criteria of a pedophilia diagnosis
and arguing that individuals who have sexual urges in response to children,
regardless of the intensity of the urges, should qualify for a pedophilia
diagnosis); Korn, supra note 111, at 594 (explaining that disturbances in
thinking, feeling, and relating to others that characterizes a mental disorder
results in a substantially diminished capacity for coping with the ordinary
demands of life); Wakefield, supra note 111, at 150 (discussing use of
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disorders are also commonly defined as causing distress,
impairment, or an increased risk of suffering or death.114
The distinction between a healthy and unhealthy mind is
neither objective nor universally accepted.115 In general,
physicians and psychiatrists define health and illness with regard
to certain goals—ideas about how bodies and minds should
operate—with illness being a type or degree of deviance from
those goals.116 As Michael Moore notes, we deem a heart that
impairment).
114. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 193 (disputing this definition); Berlin,
Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, supra note 112, at
242 (describing the diagnostic criteria of pedophilia and using the concepts of
distress, suffering, and impairment).
115. As a result, the psychiatric community and its critics have spent the
last century debating what constitutes a mental illness. See MOORE, supra note
111, at 155–216 (providing an extensive discussion about the definition of
mental illness); Zander, supra note 18, at 28 (“Debates about the validity of the
construct of ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’ have raged for the past halfcentury.”); Aragona, supra note 12, at 1–13 (providing an example of scholarship
that rejects a definition of mental disorder and argues mental disorder is best
understood as a construct, which cannot provide a clear-cut demarcation
between what is and is not a disorder). Some theorists argue that mental illness
rarely reflects illness at all, but instead reflects subjective lay concepts and
value judgments, and that the process of being labeled abnormal and ill causes
psychological and social harms rather than identifying them. Such skeptics
warn that psychiatry justifies coercive interventions to impose social norms
rather than treat legitimate illness. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 155–81
(challenging these views); Zander, supra note 18, at 28–29 (describing the
debate about the validity of the construct of mental disorder); THOMAS S. SZASZ,
THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT
(1961) (arguing against classifying psychological problems as diseases or
illnesses); Eric J. Dammann, “The Myth of Mental Illness:” Continuing
Controversies and Their Implications for Mental Health Professionals, 17
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 733 (1997) (summarizing Szasz’s views and the views of
Szasz’s critics).
This Article does not challenge the concept of mental illness. We need not
have an objective or unanimously accepted measurement of dysfunction in order
to recognize that it exists. Just because mental illness diagnoses have been used
for illegitimate purposes in the past does not mean that there is no such thing
as mental illness. On the contrary, there is significant evidence that many
individuals do suffer from mental dysfunctions. Few would argue that a severely
delusional paranoid schizophrenic is perfectly healthy simply because we have
no objective or universally accepted measurement of health. This Article accepts
the concept of mental illness and examines the difficulties of using it to
pathologize sexual interests.
116. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 28–29, 189–90 (describing functional
explanations for mental illness, which evaluate the end state or goal of a system
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cannot properly pump blood unhealthy because we believe that
the function of the heart is to pump blood through our circulatory
system and not, for example, to make noise.117
There is no established baseline conception of how a sexual
desire should function to determine when it is not functioning
properly. Sexual interest spans an enormous range.118 If
reproduction is its goal,119 then any desire for nonreproductive
sex might indicate illness; this justification would pathologize a
to determine illness); Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?, supra
note 109, at 480 (arguing it is reasonable to describe pedophilia as a disorder
because of the psychological burdens and impairments individuals sexually
attracted to children experience); Aragona, supra note 12, at 6 (discussing the
normative aspect of defining a mental disorder); Wakefield, supra note 111, at
151 (discussing the definition of mental disorder and arguing it has both a
normative and factual component). Physical medicine, for example, is concerned
with a system that maintains certain balances that contribute toward what we
consider health and survival. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 189–90 (describing
the functional analysis entailed in determining whether a person is physically
ill).
117. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 189–90 (describing the function of the
heart as pumping blood, rather than making noise in the chest cavity, because
pumping blood contributes to the proper functioning of the entire body);
Wakefield, supra note 111, at 151–52 (noting that because the function of the
heart is to pump blood, a heart that cannot pump blood is dysfunctional).
118. See BERING, supra note 9, at 99–166 (describing different types of
sexual attractions); Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?, supra
note 109 (discussing the diverse spectrum of human sexuality); Lisa Miller, The
Turn-On Switch, N.Y. MAGAZINE (July 21, 2013), http://nymag.com/nymag/
features/fetishes-2013-7/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (discussing myriad sexual
interests) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Moser, supra note
110, at 92 (“[Researchers] have yet to find an attribute that has not been
eroticized. Someone, somewhere will find the most seemingly unlikely stimulus
erotic.”).
119. See Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a Difference a Disorder?, supra note 109
(“God or nature has put sexual drive into each and every one of us for a very
important reason—the preservation of the human race.”); Jerome C. Wakefield,
Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction: A Conceptual Critique of DSM-III-R’s
Definition of a Mental Disorder, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 232, 243 (1992) (arguing that
the diagnostic criteria of a mental disorder should direct clinicians to evaluate
whether a particular system or mechanism is failing to function as it naturally
would); see also Malón, supra note 9, at 1090 (describing this view); Vernon L.
Quinsey, Coercive Paraphilic Disorder, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 405, 405–07
(2009) (analyzing coercive paraphilic disorder from an evolutionary perspective).
But see Jay R. Feierman, A Biosocial Overview of Adult Human Sexual Behavior
with Children and Adolescents, in PEDOPHILIA: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra
note 9, at 8, 26–27 (describing the evolutionary role in nonprocreative sexual
behavior).
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host of sexual interests, including same-sex attraction.120 If
human pleasure and happiness is a goal, then psychology should
pathologize a far narrower range.121 Changing social mores,
including prejudices, often inform judgments of what desires are
pathological.122 The DSM’s current definition of a paraphilia is
oddly broad and archaic, entailing “[a]ny intense and persistent
sexual interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation
or preparatory fondling with phenotypically normal, physically
mature, consenting human partners.”123
The DSM attempts to narrow this category by using
Criterion B—behavior, distress, or interpersonal difficulty—to
distinguish when sexual interest in children constitutes a mental
disorder.124 But these requirements create more problems than
they resolve. The behavior requirement raises the possibility that
clinicians will diagnose an individual based on harmful or
criminal behavior alone.125 Mental health professionals and
120. See Richard Green, Rejoinder, 31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 505, 505
(2002) (explaining that if mental disorder is characterized by a failure to
function in a natural or biologically designated way, then homosexuality is a
mental disorder).
121. See PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE 3–50
(2002) (arguing that sex serves the goal of pleasure in itself).
122. For example, same-sex attraction was once considered pathological.
Andreas De Block & Pieter R. Adriaens, Pathologizing Sexual Deviance: A
History, 50 J. SEX RES. 276, 287–89 (2013); Moser, supra note 110, at 96.
Psychiatrists also diagnosed slaves that attempted to escape with a
psychological disorder called drapetomania. Patrick Singy, Letter to the Editor,
What’s Wrong With Sex?, 39 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 1231 (2010).
123. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 685.
124. See id. at 685–86, 697–98 (defining Criterion B and explaining its
application to a diagnosis of paraphilic disorder); Berlin, Pedophilia: When Is a
Difference a Disorder?, supra note 109, at 479–80 (explaining that pedophilia is
a disorder because it creates psychological burdens and impairments for an
individual living in a society that has wisely decided to prohibit adult–child
sexual interaction).
125. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697–98 (defining Criterion A, which
includes sexual desires aroused by children, and Criterion B, which includes
acting on these desires); see also Ray Blanchard, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria
for Pedophilia, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 304, 305 (2009) (discussing DSM-IV,
but the criteria were not altered in the fifth edition); Zander, supra note 18, at
37 (stating that just because behavior is criminal does not justify labeling it as a
mental disorder); Charles Moser, Letter to the Editor, When Is an Unusual
Sexual Interest a Mental Disorder?, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 323, 324 (2009)
(“[J]ust committing a crime does not indicate psychopathy and most criminals
do not have diagnoses based upon their specific crime.”); Studer & Aylwin, supra
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governments may therefore use psychiatric diagnoses to
inappropriately pathologize what is better understood as criminal
behavior.126 The distress criterion seems counterintuitive; it
seems reasonable to be more concerned about the mental health
of an individual who is not distressed by his attraction to
children.127 Distress and interpersonal difficulty are also
questionable criteria because they may be caused by the
individual’s shame and fear of societal response rather than the
sexual desire itself.128 Given society’s view of those who have
note 24, at 777 (distinguishing child molesters and people with pedophilia by
noting that a child molester’s primary sexual attraction may not be to children);
Aragona, supra note 12, at 4 (describing concerns about the medicalization of all
bad behavior); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 574–77 (supporting the argument
that sex crimes and psychiatric illness are conflated by noting that forensic
scientists rely on criminally offensive sexual behavior to fulfill both Criterion A
and B).
126. See Moser, supra note 125 (describing the confusing nature of deciding
which sex crimes are diagnoses); De Block & Adrians, supra note 122, at 278
(discussing the medicalization of aberrant sexual behavior steered by the use of
physicians and psychiatrists as forensic experts to help ensure the state’s
control over private morality).
127. See Blanchard, supra note 125, at 306–07 (referencing other
psychiatrists who posit that the DSM’s definition of pedophilic disorder excludes
an individual who masturbates to fantasies of children but is not distressed by
these thoughts and behaviors); Richard Green, Is Pedophilia a Mental Disorder,
31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 467, 470 (2002) (critiquing the DSM’s definition of
pedophilic disorder for excluding an individual that has never acted on his
sexual attraction to children and is not distressed by his urges). Ray Blanchard,
the chair of the paraphilia sub-working group for the DSM-V, has argued that
practitioners need not worry about a pedophile who feels no distress because
distress must always follow from Criteria A. Blanchard argues that a patient
who feels sexual desire toward children but does not act on it must feel some
sort of distress because of his inability to act on it. See Blanchard, supra note
125, at 307 (“How could one experience a lifetime of sexual ‘urges,’ which are
never satisfied, with no sense of frustration?”). According to Blanchard, the
presence of a paraphilia necessitates distress if it cannot be fulfilled; otherwise,
“can one really say there was an ‘urge’ in the first place?” Id. at 307; see also
Malón, supra note 9, at 1088 (summarizing Blanchard’s argument that a
contented pedophile—an individual that never acts on his urges and experiences
no distress—does not actually exist or is extremely rare). If this is true,
however, then Criterion B serves no purpose. All individuals with Criterion A
either act on their desires or do not, and thus Criterion B encompasses all
individuals who fulfill Criterion A.
128. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1084 (discussing the criteria of distress in a
pedophilic disorder diagnosis); Alan W. Shindel & Charles A. Moser, Why Are
the Paraphilias Mental Disorders?, 8 J. SEXUAL MED. 927, 928 (2010) (explaining
that an individual with a paraphilia may experience distress because of societal
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pedophilic desires, these criteria could potentially encompass
anyone who is attracted to children. As one critic notes, “[i]t does
not seem possible for a person sexually interested in children not
to be socially impaired in some way because societal norms
dictate that it is abnormal for a person to be sexually interested
in children.”129
Perhaps most importantly, the behavior, distress, and
interpersonal difficulty criteria cannot resolve the underlying
question as to why some sexual desires raise the possibility of
pathology while others do not. Intense, recurrent desire for
vaginal intercourse with an adult is generally considered normal,
thus we do not pathologize the desire itself when an individual
acts on it, even with a non-consenting person.130 Nor is there a
paraphilic disorder diagnosis for an individual whose intense and
recurrent desire for vaginal intercourse with an adult causes him
distress because he simply does not want to have sex until
marriage. Even if these individuals were diagnosed with mental
disorders, their interest in vaginal intercourse with an adult
would be irrelevant to the diagnosis.
While arguments demonstrate the difficulty in neatly
categorizing pedophilia as a mental disorder, they do not foreclose
discrimination). The DSM attempts to avoid this problem by requiring that the
distress and impairment be caused by the paraphilia as opposed to societal
response. But it is impossible to tease out causation in this way. All distress
likely has some internal and external cause. An individual may be repulsed by
his sexual interest for children in part because he finds it morally repugnant
and in part because he knows society condemns it as morally repugnant.
129. William T. O’Donohue et al., Problems with the DSM-IV Diagnosis of
Pedophilia, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 95, 102 (2000).
130. Some psychiatrists have proposed paraphilic coercive disorder be added
to the DSM’s paraphilic disorder. This proposed disorder requires “recurrent,
intense sexually arousing fantasies or sexual urges focused on sexual coercion”
and that either the individual be distressed or impaired by the attractions or the
individual has sought sexual stimulation by forcing sex on three or more nonconsenting persons on separate occasions. See Paul Stern, Paraphilic Coercive
Disorder in the DSM: The Right Diagnosis for the Right Reasons, 39 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 1443, 1444 (2010) (arguing that paraphilic coercive disorder
“gives the judicial system the best opportunity to most accurately identify the
small group of men who have previously committed, and are likely in the future
to commit, this type of predatory sexual violence”). But this proposed disorder
again requires an intense and recurrent desire for coerced sex, as opposed to my
hypothetical, in which a man does not specifically desire coerced sex but decides
nonetheless to override his wife’s consent.
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this categorization. Part III.B, infra, will argue that, for the
purposes of the law, the concept of a mental disorder provides
perhaps the most adequate means of conceptualizing pedophilia.
These issues, however, provide room for ongoing debate about the
nature and dimensions of pedophilia as a mental disorder both in
psychiatry and the law.
2. Erotic Age Orientation: Pedophilia as a Sexual Orientation
The fifth edition of the DSM, as originally published in
October 2013, referred to pedophilia as a sexual orientation.131 It
specifically stated that an intense and persistent sexual interest
in prepubescent children that is not acted on or accompanied by
distress or impairment is better characterized as a sexual
orientation than a mental disorder.132 The text provoked an
immediate and vitriolic response, particularly from conservative
news sites and bloggers.133 These news sources interpreted it as
an attempt to normalize pedophilia and promote the sexual abuse
of children.134 In response, the APA issued a press release
131. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 698 (comparing pedophilic sexual
orientation and pedophilic disorders).
132. See id. (stating that if individuals “have never acted on their impulses,
then these individuals have a pedophilic sexual orientation but not a pedophilic
disorder”).
133. See Cheryl Wetzstein, APA to Correct Manual: Pedophilia Is Not a
“Sexual Orientation”, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, http://www.washington
times.com/news/2013/oct/31/apa-correct-manual-clarification-pedophilia-not-se/
(last updated Oct. 31, 2013) (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting “an uproar on the
internet that the APA had designated pedophilia as a sexual orientation in its
new [DSM]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dr. Susan
Berry, American Psychiatric Association Reclassifies Pedophilia, Backtracks,
BREITBART,
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2013/11/02/americanpsychiatric-association-reclassifies-pedophilia/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2013) (last
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (discussing the “public outcry” in response to the DSM-V’s
classification of pedophilia as a sexual orientation) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Hunter Stuart, Whopping Pedophilia “Sexual
Orientation” Error Sparks Right-Wing Freakout, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/31/pedophilia-sexualorientation_n_4183482.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2013) (last visited Jan. 27,
2015) (observing that “[c]onservative media outlets and pundits pounced on the
[DSM-V] statement”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. See Wetzstein, supra note 133 (discussing how bloggers bashed “the
APA for ‘mainstreaming’ deviance and capitulating to pro-pedophile groups”);
Berry, supra note 133 (citing conservative nonprofit organization’s statement
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explaining that the term “sexual orientation” was used in error.135
The press release noted that pedophilic desires that do not fulfill
Criterion B should be characterized as a sexual interest or a
paraphilia rather than a sexual orientation.136
The outcry over the DSM’s textual error demonstrates the
controversy surrounding the concept of sexual orientation and its
power. The DSM text did not normalize sexual abuse—on the
contrary, it specifically designated those who act on pedophilic
desires as having a mental disorder. But the mere possibility that
sexual interest in children could be considered a sexual
orientation sparked outrage.
While sexual orientation is commonly used to describe the
gender to which one is attracted, several scholars and advocates
argue for a more expansive definition.137 Some have proposed, for
example, that sexual orientation should include an axis of
sexuality versus asexuality—the extent to which one experiences
sexual urges or interests at all.138 Sexual orientation might also
consider the extent to which one focuses sexual interest on others
as opposed to autoeroticism.139 Other scholars have proposed
that children will ultimately suffer from “any effort to legitimize pedophilia”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Stuart, supra note 133 (noting conservative
bloggers’ and commenters’ “shared sentiment . . . that this was a logical
progression from the normalization of homosexuality that began in the 1960’s”).
135. See Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Statement on DSM-5
Text Error (Oct. 31, 2013) (stating that the term sexual orientation was used in
error “and should read ‘sexual interest’”).
136. See id. (“APA considers pedophilic disorders a ‘paraphilia,’ not a ‘sexual
orientation.’”).
137. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997,
1057–58 (2012) (arguing for a broader definition of sexual orientation); Tweedy,
supra note 17, at 1479–1509 (discussing expanding sexual orientation to include
the preference of polyamorous relationships); Michael D. Storms, Theories of
Sexual Orientation, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 783, 783–91 (1980)
(discussing the limits of common theories regarding the nature of sexual
orientation); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 303, 338–344 (2014) (proposing additional axes by which to measure
asexuality).
138. See Emens, supra note 137, at 338–40 (discussing asexuality using
existing models of sexual orientation); Storms, supra note 137, at 783–91
(positing asexuality as a distinct sexual orientation).
139. See Emens, supra note 137, at 341–42 (discussing asexuality along an
autoerotic axis); Glazer, supra note 137, at 1054–55 (arguing for separation of
sexual orientation into general orientation and specific orientation).
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expanding it to include the extent to which individuals are
polyamorous as opposed to monogamous.140 More controversial
definitions of the term might also include whether one is
attracted to humans, non-human animals, or inanimate
objects.141
Those who argue that pedophilia is a type of sexual
orientation distinguish between different types of sexual
orientations; sexual gender orientation, the focus of most
research on sexual orientation, is but one.142 This view places
pedophilia on a larger spectrum of erotic age orientation, which
describes how individuals experience sexual attraction to age
groups ranging from infants to the elderly.143 Erotic age
orientation contains at least five categories of sexual interest:
(1) pedophilia (attraction to prepubescents); (2) hebephila
(attraction to minors in early puberty); (3) ephebophilia
(attraction to older adolescents); (4) teliophilia (attraction to
sexually mature persons); and (5) gerontophilia (attraction to the
elderly).144 Some also categorize nepiophilia (attraction to infants)
as a separate type of erotic age orientation rather than a subset
of pedophilia.145
One difficulty in determining whether pedophilia should be
considered a type of sexual orientation is that, despite over a
century of social science research and legal analysis, there is no
one accepted definition of sexual orientation.146 Several means of
140. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1482–1509 (discussing polyamory as a
sexual orientation).
141. See BERING, supra note 9, at 25, 117–18 (discussing sexual attraction to
non-human animals and inanimate objects).
142. See SETO, supra note 35, at 231 (defining sexual gender orientation).
143. See id. at 3–4 & n.1, 231 (explaining sexual age orientation); BERING,
supra note 9, at 169 (discussing erotic age orientation); Hall & Hall, supra note
28, at 458 (same).
144. See BERING, supra note 9, at 169 (noting the different categories of
sexual interest); SETO, supra note 35, at 3–4 & n.1 (defining the types of sexual
interest); Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 458 (discussing categories of sexual
interest within erotic age orientation).
145. See SETO, supra note 35, at 4 (“It is not clear if sexual preference for
infants . . . represent variants of pedophilia or instead represent different
paraphilias.”).
146. See Emens, supra note 137, at 339–44 (discussing various models of
sexual orientation); Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 541
(2013) (noting that “there is no unitary definition”); Randall L. Sell, Defining
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organizing individuals into categories of sexual orientation based
on sexual interests or behaviors have been proposed, accepted,
and subsequently rejected and replaced throughout history.147
The concept of homosexuality148 has transformed over the past
century from a tendency to engage in same-sex sexual behavior,
to a type of gender deviance, to an abnormal personality and
mental disorder, and finally to an affirmative social identity.149
Still, terms such as “homosexual” and “bisexual” do not have
universally accepted characteristics.150 Nor are these terms even
widely accepted by the very communities they identify; those who
prefer to identify as gay, lesbian, or queer, for example, reject the
word “homosexual.”151
Modern conceptions of sexual orientation generally share
certain characteristics. Perhaps most prominently, sexual

and Measuring Sexual Orientation: A Review, 26 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 643,
644–49 (1997) (describing confusion surrounding the conceptual definition of
sexual orientation).
147. See Clarke, supra note 146, at 541–42 (noting that the understanding of
sexual orientation has fluctuated over time).
148. I use the term “homosexuality” and “homosexual” throughout this
Article with reservations. The term itself is not accepted by the lesbian, gay, or
bisexual community and is, in fact, offensive to many given its clinical history
and history of disparaging use. See Jeremy W. Peters, The Decline and Fall of
the “H” Word, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2014, at ST10 (“[T]hat five syllable word has
never been more loaded, more deliberately used and, to the ears of many gays
and lesbians, more pejorative.”); GLAAD Media Reference Guide: Terms to
Avoid, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/reference/offensive (last visited Jan. 27,
2015) (explaining why the term “homosexual” is offensive within the gay
community) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). However, at
times it is necessary to use the term in order to reference the actual clinical
concept rather than the fuller modern concepts of sexual orientation or lesbian,
gay, or bisexual.
149. See STEVEN SEIDMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 28 (2d
ed. 2010) (noting the changing meaning of homosexuality); see also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books
1990) (1976) (describing the changing view from sodomy as an aberration in
behavior to the homosexual as “a species”); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s
Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 277, 346–47 (2004) (discussing a historical-constructivist view of
homosexuality).
150. See Sell, supra note 146, at 644–49 (outlining the differing
understandings of terms commonly used to describe sexual orientations).
151. See sources cited supra note 148 (discussing the offensive connotation of
the term “homosexual”).

TAKING PEDOPHILIA SERIOUSLY

111

orientation generally involves a type of sexual interest.152 It also
requires sexual interests have a certain breadth and depth.153 It
implies something stronger than, say, an individual’s interest for
individuals with green eyes or dimples.154 Comparing a sexual
orientation to this type of preference trivializes sexual
orientation’s depth and its role in the individual’s psyche.155
Erotic age orientation is similarly defined by sexual interest.
Such sexual interests must be intense and persistent in order to
fall into a category; a fleeting attraction to a child is insufficient
to qualify as pedophilia.156
Sexual orientation is also widely accepted as immutable,
unchosen, and likely biological in origin.157 Sexual gender
orientation is something that one discovers rather than acquires
and which cannot be reoriented.158 Several theories point to

152. Some researchers also distinguish different types of psychological
components, such as sexual interest versus affection and love. See Sell, supra
note 146, at 648–49 (discussing various psychological components).
153. See Emens, supra note 149, at 341–43 (explaining that “polyamorists
are rarely seen as having a distinct identity”); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1466–
68 (discussing the concept of sexual orientation as an identity).
154. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1482–83 (discussing importance of
“embeddedness”). But see Ruth Hubbard & Elijah Wald, Gay Genes?, in
PROFITABLE PROMISES: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND HEALTH 81, 83 (1995)
(describing orientations toward “hair colors, body shapes, [and] racial types”).
155. See Sell, supra note 146, at 648 n.10 (explaining that the term “sexual
preference” “trivializes the depth of the psychological processes involved” and
“sexual orientation” is more appropriate because “sexual feelings are a basic
part of an individual’s psyche”); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1482–83 (noting that
sexual orientation is integral to an individual’s identity and would manifest
itself as “strong and consistent”).
156. See SETO, supra note 35, at 231–32 (defining pedophilia as “persistent
and recurrent” sexual attraction to prepubescent children).
157. See JOHN MONEY, GAY, STRAIGHT, AND IN-BETWEEN 11 (1988) (stating
sexual orientation is not a choice or preference); SETO, supra note 35, at 231
(citing research revealing that “prenatal factors . . . influence sexual gender
orientation”); Dreger, supra note 7 (describing sexual orientation as “a sexual
interest that is inborn and unchangeable”).
158. See SETO, supra note 35, at 231 (describing sexual gender orientation as
“innate” and noting that “reorientation therapies have not worked for
homosexual men”). Indeed, reorientation therapy has been so discredited and its
attendant risks so high that some states have banned such therapy for minors.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2013) (forbidding “sexual orientation
change efforts with a person under 18 years of age”).
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biological origins for sexual gender orientation, including
hormone exposure in the womb or genetic predisposition.159
There is also evidence that erotic age orientation is biological
in origin and immutable.160 Pedophilia, in particular, likely has
biological causes, and in particular neurological roots.161
Researchers are finding similar evidence of neurological
differences in men with hebephilia—intense attraction toward
early adolescents.162 There is little research on sexual interest in
late adolescents and adults—most likely because such sexual
interest is viewed as normal and unproblematic. However, the
biological distinctions between individuals living with pedophilia,
those living with hebephilia, and the remainder of the population,
indicate that all such sexual interest is likely biological in
nature.163
Like mental illness, sexual orientation raises several
conceptual dilemmas. It is not clear, for example, that sexuality
can be categorized and measured. Defining and operationalizing
sexual orientation is complicated by the recognition that sexual
159. See J. Michael Bailey, Biological Perspectives on Sexual Orientation, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL EXPERIENCES 50,
55–74 (Linda D. Garnets & Douglas C. Kimmel eds., 2003) (explaining the
neuroendocrine theory, under which sexual orientation depends on patterns of
hormone exposure); CHERYL L. WEILL, NATURE’S CHOICE: WHAT SCIENCE REVEALS
ABOUT THE BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 49–54, 63–78 (2009)
(describing the gestational neurohormonal theory and the genetics of sexual
orientation); William R. Rice et al., Homosexuality as a Consequence of
Epigenetically Canalized Sexual Development, 87 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 343, 344
(2012) (theorizing that fetal development affects an individual’s sexual gender
orientation).
160. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 776 (describing arguments that
“pedophilia, like heterosexuality or homosexuality, represents sexual arousal to
a particular identifiable group, and is not voluntarily decided, but biologically
determined”); Dreger, supra note 7 (describing sexual orientation as “inborn and
unchangeable”).
161. See supra Part II.B (discussing the causes of pedophilia in depth).
162. See Ray Blanchard et al., Pedophilia, Hebephilia, and the DSM-V, 38
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 335, 336 (2009) (discussing research results indicating
that “hebephiles” were intermediate between people with pedophilia and
teleiophiles with respect to IQ and handedness); James M. Cantor et al.,
Handedness in Pedophilia and Hebephilia, 34 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 447, 447
(2005) (“Men with primary erotic interests for . . . pubescent children show
poorer performance on intelligence and other neuropsychological tests.”).
163. See Cantor et al., supra note 162, at 457 (presenting evidence of an
“association between handedness and erotic age preference”).
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orientation may vary over time and by the fact that many
individuals resist categorization altogether.164 There is evidence
that sexuality is fluid and dynamic and defies distinct and fixed
categories.165 Such definitional problems have prompted some
theorists and advocates to argue that social science should
abandon the concept of sexual orientation altogether.166
Part III.B, infra, will analyze an additional wrinkle in
conceptualizing pedophilia as a sexual orientation—the
normative element of sexual orientation. At least with regard to
the law, sexual orientation has a normative element that is
inconsistent with the potential harmfulness inherent in
pedophilia. In the law, sexual orientation has evolved to
demarcate benign variations in sexuality. Pedophilia, in contrast,
involves the potential for harm not found in heterosexuality or
gay or lesbian sexual relationships. For this reason, for the
purposes of the law, sexual orientation is a poor fit for the concept
of pedophilia.
B. Pedophilia as a Legal Concept
This subpart analyzes the concept of pedophilia as a mental
disorder or sexual orientation in the law. The difficulties raised
above have different implications when we consider how each
concept serves distinct legal purposes and how pedophilia fits into
these purposes. The concepts of mental disorder and sexual
orientation serve specific purposes in the law.167 In contrast to
science, which uses terms and categories to describe or make
sense of some presumptive objective reality,168 the law is more
164. See Clarke, supra note 146, at 542–43 (noting that individuals are
“increasingly redefining, reinterpreting, and renegotiating their sexuality”).
165. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 45, 56 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (noting the
“mobility of sexual desire”); Emens, supra note 149, at 339–40 (discussing how
sexual desire can vary throughout an individual’s life).
166. See Clarke, supra note 146, at 542–43 (advocating for “abandon[ing] the
search for a unitary theory of sexual orientation”); Tweedy, supra note 17, at
1471–73 (discussing arguments against sexuality-based categories).
167. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 2325–26 (distinguishing legal and
sociological uses); Dreger, supra note 7 (different meaning of sexual orientation
for the purposes of the law).
168. See Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the

114

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75 (2015)

normative in nature. It reflects moral or value judgments about
the types of circumstances that merit, for example, legal
protections or the deprivation of liberty.169 These concerns will
ultimately define the parameters of the legal concepts of mental
disorder and sexual orientation.
This subpart argues that, to the extent that the law must
consider pedophilia within its current means of categorizing
sexual interests and identities, pedophilia is better suited to the
mental disorder category than the sexual orientation category.
Laws that concern sexual orientation increasingly and justifiably
recognize the legitimacy and value of different types of
relationships and sexualities. Pedophilia, while not inherently
blameworthy, involves a desire that would be harmful to others if
pursued. Laws concerning mental illness address many of the
legal concerns pedophilia raises and provides the most coherent
fit for it.
The term “sexual orientation” is fairly new to the law.170
Until the last few decades, the law only marginalized and
punished the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community. The status of
being gay, lesbian, or bisexual could not be criminalized,171 but
the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts provided a rationale
for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals to be arrested, harassed by
police, and denied equal rights in areas such as employment,
housing, and medical care.172
Courtroom, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 360 (2006) (noting that scientific
use of the terms is “largely descriptive”).
169. See id. (describing the normative significance).
170. The first case I could find using the term is a 1968 Civil Rights Act case
challenging the arrests of “hippies” who were questioned by the police about
their political affiliation and sexual orientation. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp.
881, 882–83 (E.D. Pa. 1968). The court noted that the police could arrest an
individual for sodomy and investigate a “known homosexual” speaking to a
juvenile, but they could not arrest an individual “on the basis of suspicion, or
even probable cause to believe, that the arrestee occupied the status of being a
homosexual.” Id. at 884.
171. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–68 (1962) (holding that
criminalizing status is unconstitutional).
172. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581–82 (2003) (describing effects
of the criminalization of sodomy on gay individuals); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54–
89 (2010) (describing how sodomy laws undermined the dignity and equality of
LGB individuals); Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 127–52
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The concept of sexual orientation has played an important
role in changing the law’s treatment of the lesbian, gay, or
bisexual (LGB) community. It helped shift the legal discourse
from one of marginalization and judgment to one of legitimacy
and respect.173 Sexual orientation distinguishes LGB individuals
as a distinct category with immutable—or at the very least
unchosen—characteristics.174 In doing so, it moves away from the
rhetoric of defining LGB people simply in terms of behavior and
their legal rights simply in terms of sexual practices.175 It
recognizes the legitimacy of different sexual gender orientations
and the need to protect those who face discrimination based on
their sexual orientation. Sexual orientation looks at different
types of gender attractions and recognizes that they are natural
and legitimate variations in human sexuality.176 It also reinforces
its profundity and its importance to individual identity, as
(2000) (describing how sodomy laws encourage discrimination and police
harassment of LGB individuals).
173. This importance is evidenced by the Court’s shift in approach from
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld a sodomy law, to
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which overturned Bowers. In Bowers,
the Court addressed the issue as whether the constitution protected an isolated
sexual act. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–95 (1986) (“The issue
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy . . . .”). The Lawrence Court, in contrast,
focused on the importance of the act in the greater context of the gay identity.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–78 (noting that the Bowers Court’s narrow
framing of the issue “discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of
the liberty at stake”).
174. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1468–69 (discussing the minoritizing
view of gay identity, “which incorporates the idea of LGB people as inherently
different”). This is the “minoritizing discourse” of sexual orientation, which
views LGB people as inherently different (in contrast to the universalizing
discourse, which views “homoerotic potential to be characteristically human”).
Janet E. Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY? NEW WORK
ON THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40, 48 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000); see
also Sedgwick, supra note 165, at 58 (discussing the minoritizing view of sexual
identity); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1468–73 (analyzing sexuality-based identity
categories); Emens, supra note 149, at 338–39 (outlining the minoritizing
model).
175. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in the
Court’s treatment of the LGB community).
176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing shift in the
Court’s treatment of the LGB community); see also Zander, supra note 18, at 29
(stating that homosexuality was removed from DSM based on judgment that it
is a natural variation in human sexuality).
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opposed to terms such as “sexual preference” or “homosexual
lifestyle.”177
This shift has been marked by an increase in civil rights
protections for LGB individuals. Many states repealed sodomy
laws even before the Supreme Court’s landmark Lawrence v.
Texas178 decision held them unconstitutional.179 Twenty-one
states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in a
variety of contexts, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has argued that employment discrimination
based on the sex stereotyping of lesbian, gay, or bisexual
individuals violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.180 Federal
law also punishes hate crimes targeting victims’ sexual
orientation.181 Nineteen states and the federal government
recognize marriage equality, a number that is growing since the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional much of the Defense of
Marriage Act.182 These legal protections almost universally apply

177. See Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1466–68 (discussing historical roots of
narrow understanding of sexual identity); GLAAD Media Reference Guide:
Terms to Avoid, supra note 148 (classifying “sexual preference” and “homosexual
lifestyle” as offensive).
178. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
179. See id. at 570–71 (“Over the course of the last decades, States with
same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing them.”).
180. Facts about Discrimination in Federal Government Employment Based
on Marital Status, Political Affiliation, Status as a Parent, Sexual Orientation,
or Transgender (Gender Identity) Status, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/
federal/otherprotections.cfm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (stating that gay,
lesbian, or bisexual individuals may bring a sex discrimination claim under
Title VII) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012)
(criminalizing offenses based on an individual’s sexual orientation and gender
identity).
182. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (finding that
DOMA unconstitutionally deprived same-sex couples from equal protection).
Thirty-two states and Washington, D.C. give LGB individuals the freedom to
marry, and an additional eight states have judicial rulings in favor of marriage
equality. See Overview: Pending Marriage Equality Cases, LAMBDA LEGAL
http://www.lambdalegal.org/pending-marriage-equality-cases (last updated Nov.
7, 2014) (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (presenting marriage equality statistics) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); States, FREEDOM TO MARRY
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated Oct. 17, 2014) (last visited
Jan. 27, 2015) (summarizing status of marriage equality in each state) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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only to sexual gender orientation, with one state including
asexuality.183
The law’s approach to sexual orientation, however, is not
suitable for pedophilia because of the way pedophilia differs from
sexual gender orientation. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals
have historically faced discrimination based on unwarranted
moral judgments about their sexuality. Same-sex sexual behavior
is, in reality, no more harmful than sexual behavior between
individuals of the opposite sex. On the contrary, such sexual
behaviors and relationships can be beneficial, just as
heterosexual sexual behaviors and relationships can be
beneficial. Sexual gender orientation therefore involves desire
and affection that is not simply tolerated; it is a valuable and
important part of an individual’s life and identity.
Pedophilia, in contrast, involves desire to perform sexual acts
that are harmful to others. Sexual activity between an adult and
a prepubescent child can cause the child physical and
psychological harm.184 It is a violation of an individual who is not
yet capable of giving consent to sex.185 Legal scholarship has
implicitly relied on this justification to distinguish pedophilia
while expanding the definition of sexual orientation. For example,
Ann E. Tweedy argues that pedophilia should not be considered a
sexual orientation because it would cause harm to others if acted
upon:
[A] more difficult problem is posed by sexual orientations, such
as pedophilia, that are societally disfavored because they cause
harm to others and to society at large . . . . [We would not
want] to prohibit employers from making negative
employment decisions based on such preferences or practices.
Thus, a holistic definition of “sexual orientation” in an anti183. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(27) (McKinney 2014) (defining sexual
orientation to include asexuality); Emens, supra note 149, at 362 (indicating
that New York is the only state to protect asexuality so far); Tweedy, supra note
17, at 1463–65 (discussing state protection of sexual gender orientation); see also
Dreger, supra note 7 (noting that the term sexual orientation, when used in the
legal context, does not include pedophilia).
184. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing significant harm
suffered by children); Balkin, supra note 37, at 2364–65 (discussing inherently
exploitative nature of sexual relationships with children).
185. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing a child’s inability
to consent).
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discrimination statute would, in some principled way, have to
exclude harmful sexual preferences while protecting those that
are societally disfavored simply because of prejudice.186

Tweedy is correct that, unlike sexual gender orientation,
pedophilia involves a sexual desire that should not be acted on
because it is harmful to others. While LGB communities face
prejudice based on unwarranted concerns about their sexuality,
there are good reasons to be concerned about the sexual practices
that pedophilic desires entail. In contrast to sexual gender
orientation, the nature of pedophilic sexual desire is not
something of value. Pedophilia, therefore, lacks the legitimacy
associated with the concept of sexual orientation.
Pedophilia may nonetheless raise civil rights issues where
individuals face discrimination based on their sexual interests as
opposed to their behavior. As discussed more fully below,
discrimination based on sexual attraction to children alone may
be unwarranted and the law may have good reason to prohibit
it.187 It is not that sexual attraction to children fails to raise civil
rights issues that merit protection, but rather these issues are
complicated by the fact that such preferences, if acted upon,
would be harmful to others.
For these reasons, the rubric of mental disorder is a better fit
for the issues pedophilia raises. Like sexual orientation, mental
illness is a status, not a behavior; it is not chosen; there is strong
evidence of biological causes for many mental illnesses; and
individuals living with mental illness have been the targets of
unwarranted discrimination throughout history.188 Unlike sexual
orientation, however, mental illness involves a dysfunction.
The legal concept of mental illness incorporates the idea of
dysfunction or impairment. Civil rights protections for the
mentally ill under disability law are premised on the idea that
the mental illness constitutes a “substantial impairment” on the
individual’s functioning. Mental health parity laws protect
treatment for mental illness, by their very nature implying that
mental illness merits remedy.189 Criminal laws hold that
186.
187.
188.
189.

Tweedy, supra note 17, at 1478 (footnotes omitted).
Infra Part IV.A.
Infra Part IV.A.
See Stacy A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11
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individuals are not criminally responsible where mental illness
impairs their ability to understand or control their behavior.190
Mental illness laws also acknowledge that these impairments
can raise significant public health and safety concerns.191 For
these reasons, mental health laws balance civil rights protections
with concerns about public health and safety. For example, antidiscrimination laws do not protect individuals with mental illness
from discrimination where doing so would pose a direct threat to
the health and safety of others.192 Mental illness can also justify
limiting an individual’s civil rights, as where courts use a
determination of mental illness to civilly commit a person.193
This approach relies on the assumption that it is appropriate
to consider intense and recurrent desires to harm others as the
basis for a mental disorder, at least for the purposes of the law. 194
While, as discussed above, there is certainly no objective means of
designating which desires should form the basis of a mental
disorder, intense and persistent desires to harm innocent
individuals may be one of the less controversial bases. This
approach also echoes the work of psychologists Jerome C.
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 467–69 (2012) (summarizing state law
prohibiting discrimination against an individual with mental illness by failing
to provide treatment).
190. See infra notes 346–348 and accompanying text (discussing criminal
responsibility of an individual with mental illness); MOORE, supra note 111, at
243–45 (analyzing theories behind precluding criminal responsibility).
191. See infra Part V.A.1 (addressing mental illness laws and public health
concerns).
192. See infra notes 249–254 and accompanying text (discussing the direct
threat exception).
193. See infra Part IV.B (describing civil commitment law).
194. By “desire to harm others,” I mean a desire that inherently involves
harm to others and not necessary the desire specifically to inflict harm on
others. The individual who has the desire may not view it as harmful. See Fagan
et al., supra note 28, at 2460 (characterizing pedophilia as “a chronic psychiatric
disorder”); Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 156–57 (stating that pedophilia is
when an individual’s erotic desire manifests itself as erotic attractions towards
children); Schwartz, supra note 19 (describing pedophilia as a mental illness);
Cohen & Galynker, supra note 35, at 279, 282 (defining pedophilia as a
psychiatric disorder characterized by recurrent sexual desire towards
prepubescent children). Many individuals who molest children do not believe it
harms them. There is sufficient evidence to the contrary that the presence of
harm should be beyond dispute, even if the individual is unaware of or refuses
to acknowledge it. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing
significant harm suffered by children).
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Wakefield and Agustin Malón. Wakefield argues that mental
disorders are best defined using a “harmful dysfunction” analysis,
where the term “harmful” refers to conditions judged negative by
sociocultural standards.195 Malón argues that disorders such as
pedophilic disorders are better understood as relying on a
“dangerous dysfunction” rationale, where the concern is not the
harm to the individual with the disorder, but the threat that
individual poses to others.196
Reliance on harm and danger underlies many rationales for
pathologizing pedophilia in psychiatry.197 The APA’s fact sheet on
paraphilic disorders states that a diagnosis requires either: (1) a
sexual interest that causes distress (which, as discussed above,
lacks utility) or (2) “a sexual desire or behavior that involves
another person’s psychological distress, injury, or death, or a
desire for sexual behaviors involving unwilling persons or persons
unable to give legal consent.”198 Psychiatric scholarship also cites
the harm that sexual contact with minors would inflict when
discussing why pedophilia should be considered pathological.199
Distinguishing pedophilia as a mental disorder based on the
dangerousness of the desires is not without problems. Relying on
195. See Wakefield, supra note 111, at 149 (defining “harmful dysfunction”).
196. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1088–93 (explaining “dangerous
dysfunction” rationale).
197. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155–57 (stating that “psychiatric
help may be needed” if an individual “experiences strong erotic attractions
towards unacceptable sexual partners, such as children”); Fagan et al., supra
note 28, at 2460 (indicating that pedophilic behaviors are “the primary concern
of mental health and criminal justice systems,” not fantasies or impulses);
Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, supra note
112, at 242–43 (noting society’s responsibility to protect children from harm).
198. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PARAPHILIC DISORDERS 1 (2013) (emphasis
added), http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Paraphilic%20Disorders%20Fact%20S
heet.pdf.
199. See, e.g., Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155–57 (stating that erotic
desire to engage in behavior that harms others or with inappropriate partners
may merit psychiatric treatment); Malón, supra note 9, at 1088–93 (arguing
that the pedophilic disorder diagnosis reflects concerns that the sexual interest
poses harm to others rather than harm to the diagnosed person); Robert L.
Spitzer, Harmful Dysfunction and the DSM Definition of Mental Disorder, 108 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 430, 431 (1999) (“Because pedophilic behavior results in
the victimization of children, the dysfunction also represents a harmful
condition by social standards. Thus pedophilia . . . is correctly classified as a
disorder, not a normal variant.”).
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dangerousness to others to distinguish a mental disorder may
medicalize all desire to engage in undesirable behavior. But this
potential problem should be distinguished from the more
troubling problem of pathologizing behavior. This Article
suggests that pedophilia should be pathologized because of the
intense and recurrent interest—a mental component—in harming
others, not because of any particular behavior.200 It therefore does
not raise the problem of pathologizing all criminal behavior. The
potential for overbreadth can also be mitigated by drawing a
principled boundary based on the intensity and recurrence of the
interest.
The proposed approach does fail, however, to resolve
significant debate about whether sexual interests are appropriate
bases for psychological diagnoses201 and, if so, what the precise
parameters of a pedophilia diagnoses should be.202 The law’s
normative distinctions should not rely on questionable science.
Yet the law can appropriately consider pedophilia a mental
disorder without perfect understanding of its parameters. It
currently does precisely this for several mental disorders, from
depression
to
obsessive-compulsive
disorder.203
Courts,
lawmakers, and legal scholars should continue to engage with the

200. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1093 (urging caution that the dangerous
dysfunction analysis might pathologize bad behavior).
201. See Zander, supra note 18, at 37–40 (summarizing “debate about the
conceptual validity of the diagnosis of pedophilia”); Studer & Aylwin, supra note
24, at 776–78 (advocating that future DSM editions should drop pedophilia as a
category); Malón, supra note 9, at 1086 (discussing controversy surrounding the
appropriateness of considering paraphilias as mental disorders); Shindel &
Moser, supra note 128, at 928 (arguing that all paraphilias should be removed
from the DSM); Moser, supra note 110, at 92–93 (stating paraphilias are “a
pseudoscientific attempt to regulate sexuality”); Prentky et al., supra note 168,
at 366 (citing controversy regarding diagnostic validity); Green, supra note 127,
at 469–70 (questioning validity of diagnosis of pedophilia).
202. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1088–90 (describing disagreement over how
pedophilia should be operationalized); Zander, supra note 18, at 37–40
(describing concerns about pedophilia’s validity and reliability).
203. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Empire of Illness: Competence and
Coercion in Health-Care Decision Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 824–34
(2007) (characterizing depression as a mental illness and noting the medical
field’s evolving understanding of depression); Jerry Von Talge, Major Depressive
Disorder, 26 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 1 (2014) (noting that “the precise
etiology of depression is still not clearly understood”).
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conceptual and practical issues surrounding pedophilia as our
understanding of it—and mental illness in general—evolves.
IV. Rethinking the Law’s Approach to Pedophilic Disorder
This Part argues that, if the law conceptualizes pedophilia as
a mental disorder, we should carefully reconsider areas of law
that implicate it. While several areas of law recognize pedophilia
as a mental illness, they often distinguish it as part of a special
category with more limited civil rights protections. Part IV
argues that distinguishing pedophilia is problematic, specifically
in the context of disability law and civil commitment. There are
legitimate reasons for denying some individuals living with
pedophilic disorder employment based on their mental illness,
and there are legitimate reasons for subjecting them to civil
commitment. Current statutes, however, do not adequately
distinguish the legitimate reasons from those based on disgust
and unfounded fears.
A. Pedophilia and Anti-Discrimination Law
1. Disability Discrimination and the Pedophilia Exception
Several federal and state statutes prohibit discrimination
based on mental illness.204 Among these statutes are the ADA
and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act).205
204. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination
based on mental disabilities); 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793–94 (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on mental disabilities).
205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) also prohibits
housing discrimination on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). Like
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the FHA prohibits discrimination based on
mental disorders that substantially impair major life activities. Id. § 3602(h); see
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (noting that the ADA uses the same
definition for “disability” that the FHA does for “handicap”). Unlike the ADA
and Rehabilitation Act, however, pedophilia is not explicitly excluded from
coverage. Courts often interpret the FHA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act
definition of disability similarly, which would support excluding pedophilic
disorder from coverage. See id. at 631 (noting similar interpretations of
“disability”). Unfortunately, there is no case law resolving this issue. If the FHA
covered pedophilic disorder, then the FHA’s direct threat analysis would apply.
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Together, these laws prohibit both public and private actors from
discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities in areas such as employment, education, and medical
care.206 These acts use similar terminology, and courts
interpreting one statute will look to case law involving the
others.207 States and municipalities also have statutes that
mirror these acts and look to these federal laws for interpretation
and implementation.208
These federal laws define disability to include “a mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.”209 A mental impairment includes “[a]ny mental or
psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness.”210
Major life activities include the functions of major bodily systems;
thus, an impairment that interferes with brain function or
reproductive function will qualify as a disability.211 It also
includes mental impairments that interfere with mental
processes such as the ability to concentrate, think, or learn, as
well as the ability to engage in sexual relations and interact with
others.212
The arguments set forth below about pedophilic disorder and the direct threat
analysis would apply to the FHA.
206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213; 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793–94.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (interpreting the ADA through Rehabilitation
Act regulations and case law); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (mirroring the ADA’s
terminology); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598–600 (1999)
(discussing the history of the ADA); id. at 618–19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(interpreting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act).
208. See, e.g., Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability”
Discrimination: A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers,
14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 334 (2003) (describing the development of state
anti-discrimination laws and their relationship to the ADA); Levy v. Comm’n on
Human Rights & Opportunities, 671 A.2d 349, 355 (Conn. 1996) (reviewing
federal precedent concerning employment discrimination for guidance in
enforcing state anti-discrimination statutes).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9).
210. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2011).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (“[A] major life activity also includes the
operation of a major bodily function, including . . . brain . . . and reproductive
functions.”); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (referencing the definitions in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102).
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“[M]ajor life activities include . . . learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”); 29 U.S.C.
§ 705(9) (referencing the definitions in 42 U.S.C. § 12102).
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This definition would seem to include several instances of
individuals living with pedophilic disorder. Pedophilic disorder is
a mental illness that can impair major life activities such as
reproduction, the ability to engage in sexual relations, and the
ability to interact with others.213 Indeed, one of the diagnostic
criteria for pedophilic disorder is interpersonal difficulty.214
The ADA’s definition of disability, however, explicitly
excludes “sexual behavior disorders” such as pedophilia.215
Congress included this exception to ease Senator Jesse Helms’s
concerns that the ADA’s coverage of mental disorders might
protect transvestites.216 The Rehabilitation Act similarly excludes
pedophilic disorder from its exception of disability.217 As a result,
individuals living with pedophilic disorder have no legal
protection against discrimination based on their mental disorder
in employment or in medical treatment, education, and other
public accommodations.218
This has significant consequences for an individual living
with pedophilic disorder. Most notably, he may lose his job and
become unemployable if he openly identifies as living with
pedophilia or if he fails to hide his disorder adequately, even if he

213. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing the lives of those with
pedophilic disorder).
214. DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697.
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2012) (listing exclusions from the ADA’s
disability definition, including sexual behavior disorders, gambling,
kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting
from current illegal use of drugs).
216. See Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with
Disabilities Act as Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1473–77 (1994)
(discussing the considerations which led to the exclusion of sexual and gender
identity disorders from the ADA); Equality of Opportunity: The Making of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1997/equality_of_Opportunity_The_Making_of_
the_Americans_with_Disabilities_Act (last updated July 26, 2010) (last visited
Jan. 27, 2015) (summarizing the legislative and political history of the ADA) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 135 CONG. REC. 10,765
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (summarizing the debate over the ADA and sexual
disorders).
217. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F).
218. See Hiegel, supra note 216, at 1467–75 (discussing the ADA’s standard
for disability and its treatment of sexual behavior and gender identity
disorders).
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has engaged in no criminal conduct.219 He may therefore lose his
job, and all future job prospects, if he is seen at a group therapy
session or participates in an organization that counsels
individuals on avoiding offending.220 He may even face these
consequences if he is merely suspected of having pedophilic
disorder.221 These consequences underscore the difficulty and
importance of remaining closeted, as discussed supra in Part
III.C.
An individual living with pedophilic disorder also has no
right to accommodations that might aid in his treatment or
reduce the risk of engaging in sexual abuse. For example, he
would be unable to obtain a reasonable accommodation that
would allow him to attend therapy on a regular basis.222 This may
seem like a slight inconvenience, but supportive treatment for
individuals living with pedophilic disorder is actually quite
rare.223 In the first thirty-eight months of Prevention Project
Dunkelfeld, discussed above, patients traveled an average of two
hundred and five kilometers to the outpatient clinic, with some
traveling internationally.224
Some individuals living with pedophilic disorder may also
require an employer to accommodate difficulty working with

219. See id. at 1480 (“The ADA allows an employer to make distinctions
among its workers based not on a general moral code, but according to a specific
scheme of sexual ethics.”).
220. See id. at 1481 (“Hearing or knowing that an employee is a member of
an unprotected group—the statement of an identity—may constitute ‘conduct’
sufficient to make the employee vulnerable to discharge.”).
221. See id. at 1481 (“It is the imaginative workings, through fear and
stereotype, of employers and fellow employees which make these external
activities a sign of ‘unqualified’ employment status.”).
222. Compare Hibbler v. Reg’l Med. Ctr. at Memphis, 12 F. App’x 336, 339
(6th Cir. 2001) (noting that employer reduced hours so that employee could
attend swimming therapy), and Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519,
526 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing an employer accommodation granting an
employee time off to attend TMJ therapy), with Johnson v. City of Blaine, 970 F.
Supp. 2d 893, 912 (D. Minn. 2013) (noting that an employer was not obligated to
excuse employee from mandatory overtime in order to attend group therapy for
depression because mandatory overtime was an essential function of the job and
employee was free to request leave for appointments).
223. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
224. See Beier et al., supra note 77, at 547 (describing the results of Project
Dunkelfeld).
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children. As a woman writing on the Virtuous Pedophiles website
describes:
I’m very good with children and love being with them.
Everyone says so, I wanted to be a teacher growing up. But
underneath it all there’s always been that attraction that pops
up unexpectedly. I try and bury it and that works for a few
weeks but then it comes back with force and I feel worse than
ever. So I quit [a childcare course] and I couldn’t even tell
anyone why. They still encourage me to get back into childcare
and that is so hard . . . .225

2. Rethinking the Pedophilia Exception
Recognizing pedophilic disorder as a disability is consistent
with the goals of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.226 The ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act were passed to respond to the
challenges individuals living with disabilities face in a
community that often views them as inferior, isolates them, and
denies them social and economic opportunities.227 While this may
be true of several groups of individuals, lawmakers and courts
are particularly concerned with the unwarranted and pervasive
discrimination individuals with disabilities face.228
The ADA recognizes that those with mental disorders often
face unwarranted fear, stigma, and discrimination.229 They are
isolated from social and economic opportunities based on
stereotypes that they are morally weak, violent, erratic, deviant,
225. Who We Are, supra note 1.
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (listing the historical context of and
purpose for the ADA).
227. See id. (including in a statement of findings that “many people with
physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from [fully participating in
all aspects of society] because of discrimination”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING
FROM HUMANITY 305 (2004) (discussing the social stigma surrounding people
with disabilities); Korn, supra note 111, at 586–87, 605–07 (describing
stereotypes and other negative views of the mentally ill).
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (noting the priorities of addressing
discrimination against those with disabilities); NUSSBAUM, supra note 227, at
305–07 (describing the discrimination that disabled individuals experience);
Korn, supra note 111, at 605–12 (describing the negative stereotypes of the
mentally ill).
229. See Korn, supra note 111, at 605–15 (cataloging the negative
stereotypes of the mentally ill).
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sexually unrestrained, and untreatable.230 They also face
unfounded views that their disabilities are less legitimate and
that they stem from moral failing.231 Individuals living with
mental disorders are isolated and denied employment out of fear
that they are prone to violence or crime, even though the
correlation between violence and mental illness is weak.232 They
face high unemployment rates despite the fact that most
individuals with mental illness can work and, in fact, work may
aid their symptoms.233 Individuals with mental disorders even
face discrimination within the disabled community.234 As a result,
individuals are more likely to remain silent about their disability
and forego treatment rather than endure isolation and stigma of
mental illness.235
Pedophilic disorder is no less a mental disorder plagued by
stigma and discrimination.236 It is unchosen, biological in nature,
and not within the individual’s control.237 While an individual
living with pedophilic disorder remains responsible for his
actions, there is nothing blameworthy about having the mental
illness of pedophilic disorder.238 Indeed, many individuals living
230. See id. at 605–07 (describing the social stigma of the mentally ill).
231. See id. at 605 (“Many believe that if mentally ill people would only try
harder, they would get well. In this view, mental illness is due to internal
weakness or other personal shortcomings.”).
232. See id. at 609–12 (describing the stereotype of violence that mentally ill
people face).
233. See id. at 587 (“In the United States, 70-90% of persons classified as
mentally disabled were unemployed and not seeking work. . . . Moreover, recent
studies indicate that people with mental disabilities can work, and that working
may decrease symptoms.”).
234. See id. at 601–02 (“[S]ome people with mental disorders . . . perceive
that the disability rights movement has traditionally excluded people with
mental illness. Accordingly, some people with a mental illness feel that they are
discriminated against even within the disability community.”).
235. See id. at 606 (“The stigma of being diagnosed with a mental illness
may cause some to forgo treatment, rather than incur the many disadvantages
of being labeled ‘mentally ill.’”).
236. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (examining the stigma and
isolation surrounding pedophilic disorder).
237. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155 (describing human sexuality
generally); Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing differing views of pedophilia as a
mental illness).
238. See Berlin & Krout, supra note 8, at 155 (describing human sexuality
generally); Schwartz, supra note 19 (discussing pedophilia as a mental illness).
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with the disorder are often distressed and disgusted by their own
desires and have never acted on them.239
The stigma of living with this mental disorder is perhaps
unsurpassed. Individuals living with pedophilic disorder are the
most universally despised group in modern society.240 Even
among other marginalized groups, those living with pedophilic
disorder are outcasts. The LGB community has worked,
understandably, to distance themselves from unwarranted
comparisons to pedophiles.241 The disability rights movement has
made no effort to include it among its mental disorder
protections.242 The contempt for pedophilia even limits funding
for research on the causes and treatment of pedophilic disorder.243
Those living with pedophilic disorder have no allies and are the
allies no one wants.
239. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (noting that many people with pedophilia
want help and try to control their behavior).
240. See BERING, supra note 9, at 156 (describing the stigma associated with
people with pedophilia in society); Malón, supra note 9, at 1094 (noting that the
diagnosis of pedophilia is closely associated with a moral judgment); Bleyer,
supra note 4 (describing social attitudes towards people with pedophilia and the
impact on treatment options); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (noting the social
isolation people with pedophilia experience).
241. See Yoshino, supra note 17, at 846 (arguing that gays can “cover” by
distancing themselves from people with pedophilia); Kenji Yoshino, The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 427 (2000) (noting
that the gay movement rejects pedophilia because it undermines their
legitimacy); Balkin, supra note 37, at 2363–64 (noting that a standard attack on
homosexuals is to degrade them by associating them with sexual deviants such
as pedophiles); Bleyer, supra note 4 (describing accusations that pedophilia is
driven by a “homosexual agenda” for gay men to have sex with boys); Charles
Silverstein, The Implications of Removing Homosexuality from the DSM as a
Mental Disorder, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 161, 161–62 (2009) (describing
that, when fighting for the removal of homosexuality from the DSM, the gay
community did not want to discuss implications for other paraphilias,
particularly pedophilia); Duncan Osborne, The Trouble with NAMBLA,
ADVOCATE, Dec. 14, 1993, at 40 (describing the schism between gay rights
activists and pedophile activists); Joyce Price, Pedophiles Resisting Expulsion
from Gay Umbrella Organization, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at A4 (noting the
gay community’s resistance to including people with pedophilia).
242. See Hiegel, supra note 216, at 1474–76 (describing the moral
qualifications behind the ADA’s definition of disability).
243. See Tarred and Feathered, supra note 19 (“Funders don’t want to be
associated with pedophilia research. The stigma is too great.”); Ellsworth, supra
note 42 (“But because of the societal disdain for the disorder, institutions are
unwilling to fund pedophilia studies.”).
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There are several arguments in favor of excluding pedophilic
disorder from anti-discrimination statutes. Most notably, some
individuals living with pedophilic disorder may pose an increased
danger to others by nature of their mental illness.244 Those living
with pedophilic disorder experience urges to commit abuses
against children, a particularly vulnerable population.245 Antidiscrimination law should not put children in increased danger of
sexual abuse.246
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, however, anticipate
this issue and incorporate measures to protect public health and
safety. Both acts, for example, require that the disabled
individual is “otherwise qualified” for the position and does not
pose a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others.247 An
employer may therefore lawfully discriminate against an
individual with a disability if that individual would pose a
significant risk to the health or safety of others that could not be
eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.248
Courts have, for decades, used the direct threat analysis to
balance the need to prevent unwarranted discrimination with
concerns about the safety and health of employers. These cases
often entail risks of serious injury or death. Courts have
considered, for example, potential risk of HIV transmission by

244. See Courtney Flack, Chemical Castration: An Effective Treatment for
the Sexually Motivated Pedophile or an Impotent Alternative to Traditional
Incarceration?, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 173, 174 (2005) (“Sex offenders who commit their
crimes against children often struggle with an inappropriate and uncontrollable
sexual desire for their child victims. Pedophiles may act on their sexual feelings
despite . . . confinement or lengthy incarceration.”).
245. See id. at 177 (“The sexual appetite of the pedophile can be dangerously
insatiable.”).
246. Similar arguments about individuals who are attracted to adults are
less convincing. One might argue, for example, that the logic that prohibits
those with pedophilic disorder from caring for children should similarly prohibit
heterosexual man from caring for women who lack capacity, such as severely
mentally ill or unconscious women. But a defining characteristic of pedophilic
disorder is an intense attraction to those who cannot consent. A heterosexual
man does not have an attraction that is specific to those who cannot consent. A
better analogy would be a man who has an intense attraction to unconscious
women; such an attraction would raise valid concerns about his ability to
appropriately care for unconscious women.
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–113 (2012).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (defining a “direct threat”).
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health care workers,249 risk of tuberculosis transmission to school
children,250 and the risk posed by a lifeguard’s hearing
impairment251 or a truck driver’s visual impairment.252 In the
context of mental disorders, courts have considered potential
direct threats such as those posed by a surgeon whose manic
nature causes him to be unable to successfully complete surgery,
or a bus driver who is unable to safely operate a bus due to
problems forming judgments, controlling his mood, and
responding to stress.253 Courts have also considered the threat
posed by an individual living with a mental disorder that is
correlated with violent behavior.254
While the direct threat analysis prioritizes health and safety,
it rejects the use of sweeping generalizations about people with
mental illness toward this end. The direct threat analysis
requires employers to consider the specifics of the individual’s
mental illness, including the diagnosis, its degree, its

249. See Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir.
1998) (“All the evidence, together with the uncontradicted fact that a wound
causing an HIV-infected surgical technician to bleed while in the body cavity
could have catastrophic results and near certainty of death, indicates that [the
worker] was a direct threat.”).
250. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987)
(discussing the circumstances under which persons with contagious diseases are
included under the ADA).
251. See Schultz v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 139 F.3d 286, 288–89 (1st
Cir. 1998) (considering whether the ability to hear is an essential function of
lifeguarding).
252. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 569 (1999)
(considering whether a truck driver’s visual impairment posed a direct threat
under the ADA).
253. See Haas v. Wyo. Valley Health Care Sys., 465 F. Supp. 2d 429, 435–36
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (discussing the standards for the direct threat exception and
determining it to be a triable issue of fact in this case); F.F. v. City of Laredo,
912 F. Supp. 248, 254 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (“In light of the direct threat against
public safety posed by his condition, Plaintiff could not perform the ‘essential
functions’ of his job as a passenger bus driver.”).
254. See, e.g., Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the
“Dangerous Mentally Ill”, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 867 (2001) (summarizing
research correlating mental disorders with violent behavior); McKenzie v.
Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1354–55 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that an individual
living with post-traumatic stress disorder posed a threat to health and safety of
others, as evidenced by her dangerous behavior, including shooting her off-duty
revolver at her father’s grave).
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manageability, and its behavioral consequences.255 In the context
of mental health, for example, fears of violent behavior may not
be based on generalizations about the individual’s mental
disorder. An individualized inquiry must demonstrate that the
person at issue poses a serious risk of violence, looking to
evidence such as the individual’s threatening behavior or
previous assaults.256
This individualized inquiry requirement is critical because a
general diagnosis of mental illness tells us little about the risk
particular individuals pose. Although there is a correlation
between certain mental disorders and violence, a diagnosis in
itself provides insufficient information to determine whether an
individual poses a risk of violence.257 For example, if multiple
diagnoses are considered, the rate of violence among those
diagnosed with schizophrenia-related disorders, obsessivecompulsive disorder, panic disorder, major depression, or bipolar
disorder is five to six times the rate of violence among those with
no disorder.258 But the majority of individuals with these
diagnoses are still non-violent, and a diagnosis alone provides
little predictive value of future violence.259 Individual factors such
255. See Korn, supra note 111, at 600 (discussing the stereotypes and
generalizations of the mentally ill and how such generalizations can be more
personalized).
256. See McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1347–48 (summarizing expert testimony on
the direct threat issue as applied to the specific facts of the case).
257. There is a weak correlation between mental disorders and violence. See
Hubbard, supra note 254, at 870–73 (summarizing epidemiological evidence
analyzing the correlation between violence and various mental disorders). This
correlation increases depending on the diagnosis, with higher rates of violence
among those diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. See Hubbard,
supra note 254, at 870–71 (noting that schizophrenia and related disorders had
the highest rates of violence in the study, with 8% committing a violent act in
the preceding year); Seena Fazel et al., Bipolar Disorder and Violent Crime:
New Evidence from Population-Based Longitudinal Studies and Systematic
Review, 67 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 931, 934 (2010) (“[T]here was an
increased risk of violent crime among the individuals with bipolar
disorder . . . .”).
258. See Hubbard, supra note 254, at 871 (“Taking multiple diagnoses into
account, the prevalence of violence among all persons with schizophreniarelated disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, major
depression or bipolar disorder ranged from 10.66% to 12.69%.”).
259. See id. (“Although these rates are five to six times the rates of violence
by persons with no disorder, they also indicate that seven out of eight persons
with schizophrenia and nine of ten persons with major depression did not report
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as recent past violence, personal traits such as anger,
aggressiveness, and impulsivity, alcohol and drug dependence,
personal conflicts and perceived threats and hostility, and active
psychotic symptoms are important in predicting violent
behavior.260
The direct threat analysis allows the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act to protect public health and safety while
rejecting the assumption that individuals with pedophilic
disorder are categorically too dangerous to employ. The risk of
any individual living with pedophilic disorder committing sexual
abuse cannot be discerned from generalizations about the
disorder.261 While pedophilic disorder is likely a risk factor for
offending, macro-level statistics are unable to determine the risk
that any one individual living with pedophilic disorder poses. An
individualized inquiry is necessary to consider the risks that a
specific person with pedophilia poses. Several variables will affect
this risk, including: the individual’s attitude toward offending
and treatment, whether he has previously offended, and whether
his mental disorder is co-morbid with other mental disorders,
such as ones indicating impulse control or antisocial personality
disorder.262 An individual who has never offended and believes
child sex abuse is morally wrong will pose far less of a threat
than an individual who has offended or believes that children
enjoy sexual abuse.
In this way, pedophilic disorder is similar to other mental
illnesses that are associated with criminal behavior, and in
particular with violence. It is no more a choice than bipolar
disorder, can significantly impair an individual’s ability to engage
in major life activities, and is subject to substantial stigma and
discrimination. While pedophilic disorder likely correlates with
an increased risk of sexual abuse, having pedophilic disorder does
not make one a sexual predator; just as with other mental
illnesses, different individuals living with pedophilic disorder will
a single incident of violence.”).
260. See id. at 873–85 (reviewing literature on the individual factors likely
to contribute to violent behavior).
261. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (noting that many people with pedophilia
want help and try to control their behavior).
262. See SETO, supra note 35, at 150–55 (discussing risks for previous
offenders).
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pose vastly different types of risks in different contexts.263 The
direct threat analysis protects public health and safety while
ensuring that decisions are based on valid risk assessments
rather than mere disgust with the mental disorder.
In reality, it is likely that judges and juries will err on the
side of finding a direct threat. Unless and until juries and judges
see individuals living with pedophilic disorder more openly and
safely acting as law-abiding members of society, cases are likely
to face reflexive dismissal based on questionable evidence of
direct threat. HIV provides a useful case study. Case law for HIV
disability claims is replete with decisions in which a court,
contrary to medical consensus, found that an individual living
with HIV posed a direct threat or was not otherwise qualified for
the position because of transmission threat.264 Several circuits
accepted even a theoretical chance of transmission as sufficient to
demonstrate a direct threat.265 It is likely that individuals living
with pedophilic disorder will similarly face a presumption against

263. See Hubbard, supra note 254, at 885–86 (describing the wide variety of
individual circumstances that can affect the threat presented by a single
individual with a mental illness).
264. See, e.g., Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,
1281 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e conclude that the record establishes that the
district court properly granted summary judgment to Valley Forge because an
HIV-infected dental hygienist like Waddell poses a significant risk of HIV
transmission to his patients.”); Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 878 (4th Cir.
1999) (“[A] significant risk to the health and safety of others would exist if [the
individual with HIV] were allowed to participate in the group karate classes.”);
EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1095 (6th Cir. 1998)
(considering whether an employee who may have HIV constitutes a direct
threat); Leckelt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 829 (5th
Cir. 1990) (“Although none of Leckelt’s duties apparently fell within the
technical definition of an invasive procedure, at least some of these duties
provided potential opportunities for HIV transmission to patients.”); see also
Katrina Atkins & Richard Bales, HIV and the Direct Threat Defense, 91 KY. L.J.
859, 879–90 (2003) (summarizing the different approaches of courts to
determining whether HIV constitutes a direct threat); Dawn-Marie Harmon,
Comment, HIV and the ADA: What Is a Direct Threat?, 55 ME. L. REV. 391, 407–
25 (2003) (analyzing the direct threat exception to the ADA across different
circuits).
265. See Atkins & Bales, supra note 264, at 879–90 (discussing circuits’
differing views of HIV as a direct threat); Harmon, supra note 264, at 393 (“[A]
showing of a theoretical possibility of transmission is enough to invoke the
direct threat exception, even if the odds of transmission are extremely small.”).
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their claims. Insofar as this presumption contravenes the
requirements of the ADA, it certainly merits concern.266
Another reason to exclude pedophilic disorder from the
disability definition is that inclusion would likely increase
burdens on employers. At the moment, employers need not justify
the decision to fire an individual because he has pedophilic
disorder—the pedophilic disorder itself is sufficient justification.
ADA protection would require that an employer perform a direct
threat analysis before firing the employee, just as he must for
individuals living with mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or
bipolar disorder. Many courts also place the burden on the
employer to prove a direct threat if litigation arises.267
This burden may not be as heavy as many fear. In many
circumstances, this would pose little challenge to an employer. A
defendant would have a strong argument that an individual
living with pedophilic disorder who has a history of child sex
abuse poses a direct threat in a position that involved contact
with children, particularly if the position creates any possibility
that the individual would care for a child. Other circumstances
might be more challenging, such as where a plaintiff with no
history of offending seeks a position that involves responsibility
over children and provides evidence that he poses no threat in the
form of testimony from psychiatrists. In other positions,
individuals with pedophilic disorder will clearly pose no threat to
others, such as a lab technician who works only with blood
samples, a computer programmer in an office environment, or a
neurosurgeon. In all situations, however, juries and judges are
likely to err strongly on the side of finding a direct threat.268
266. I cite it not in approval but to demonstrate that the direct threat is
likely to provide robust protection for defendants in this context.
267. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1171 (E.D. Mich.
1996), rev’d on other grounds, 172 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
employer carries the burden of proving a direct threat); Rizzo v. Children’s
World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1996) (“As with all
affirmative defenses, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
employee is a direct threat.”); see also Ann Hubbard, Understanding and
Implementing the ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1283
(2001) (“[T]he employer has the burden of persuading the fact finder that the
employee or applicant poses a direct threat in the workplace.”). But see EEOC v.
Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 142–44 (1st Cir. 1997) (putting the burden on the
plaintiff to prove that he does not pose a direct threat).
268. See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text (predicting how the
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Regardless, it is not clear that pedophilic disorder should be
categorically denied disability protection provided to other mental
disorders simply because litigating such cases burdens
employers. It is true that litigating will still pose a burden to
employers even if the odds are stacked in their favor. But this is
the case for all disabilities. This is true even when the stakes are
high, such as when an employer must consider whether an
employee’s mental disorder makes him violent, whether a
physical or mental disability compromises his ability to drive a
bus safely, fly a plane, or supervise children or the elderly, or
whether the employee poses a risk of transmitting HIV, hepatitis,
or other serious illness.269
Another argument against recognizing pedophilic disorder as
a disability is it will dilute the rights provided to other
individuals living with mental disorders. As discussed above,
courts are likely to interpret the direct threat analysis liberally
and find direct threats even when they are unsupported by
scientific evidence. The resulting case law may be used against
other individuals living with mental disorders to diminish their
ability to bring anti-discrimination claims. This may be the
reason that the disability community has not sought to include
those with pedophilic disorder.
While this is a valid claim, it nonetheless seems questionable
to deny a group civil rights protections for this reason. If
pedophilic disorder is a mental illness that can substantially
impair a major life activity, it is dubious to allow these
individuals protection against unwarranted discrimination only if
it does not adversely affect other disabled individuals. The ADA
has thus far stood by controversial decisions to include unpopular
groups that raise direct threat issues—most notably individuals
with mental illness and HIV.270 It is not clear that pedophilic
disorder merits an exceptional response.
courts will handle a direct threat analysis for those with pedophilic disorder).
269. See supra notes 249–254 and accompanying text (discussing sample
litigation under the ADA).
270. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 216 (discussing
objections to the inclusion of individuals living with mental illness and HIV).
See generally Hubbard, supra note 267 (discussing Congress’s decision to
include in the ADA individuals living with mental illness and use of a narrow
direct threat analysis to contend with those who pose threats).
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Lawmakers may also exclude pedophilic disorder from
disability protections because such protections have an important
legitimizing role. Statutes such as the ADA send a message that
disability is not a moral failing or adequate reason to exclude
individuals from economic, social, and other opportunities.271
They serve as a symbolic welcoming of individuals living with
disabilities into the mainstream society—indeed, they redefine
what mainstream society is and should be.272
Lawmakers may hesitate to send this message about those
living with pedophilic disorder. This may be due, in part, to the
conflation of pedophilic disorder and sexual assault and other
criminal behavior.273 It may also be a reaction to those with
pedophilic disorder who seek to justify the sexual assault of
children.274 Even the mental disorder itself—isolated from the
despicable behavior or attitudes of some individuals who live with
it—prompts widespread disgust and derision.275
These concerns do not justify distinguishing this mental
illness for the purpose of anti-discrimination law. Revulsion for
sexual assault and those who attempt to justify it is well founded.
But including pedophilic disorder among ADA and Rehabilitation
Act protections would not provide civil rights protections for
sexual assault or those who promote it. These behaviors are not
equivalent to pedophilic disorder, and would be indicators that an
individual living with pedophilic disorder poses a direct threat.
Pedophilic disorder is not a choice for which an individual is
responsible and therefore it is not a moral failing.
271. See Hiegel, supra note 216, at 1452 (“The ADA reconfigures our norms
of physical capability at the same time that it revises our vision of America,
guaranteeing equal political and economic rights to a population traditionally
excluded from full participation in American public life.”).
272. See id. (“Intended to prohibit the use of myths and stereotypes
associated with a disability as a basis for private decisions, the Act is an
important symbolic gesture of ‘welcome’ into ‘the mainstream of American
society,’ a statement about the respect and dignity of those considered physically
or mentally limited.”).
273. See Studer & Aylwin, supra note 24, at 776 (describing confusion of
pedophilia as a status and describing child sexual abuse).
274. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the attitudes of
people with pedophilia toward sexual abuse of children).
275. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (summarizing the stereotypes
and stigmas surrounding those with pedophilic disorder).
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In sum, the challenges involved in granting pedophilic
disorder disability protections are not unique to it as a mental
illness, and it is questionable that they warrant a categorical
exemption from disability protection. The protections of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act prohibit employers and other parties
from excluding individuals with mental disorders based on
stereotypes or disgust. It requires them instead to base decisions
on evidence and to ensure their concerns are legitimate. If the
law accepts that individuals living with pedophilic disorder do,
indeed, have a mental disorder, then we should carefully consider
our reasons for excluding them from these protections.
The more practical arguments against including pedophilic
disorder as a disability should also be weighed against the
potential benefits. Recognizing pedophilic disorder as a mental
illness under the ADA would improve the ability of individuals
living with pedophilic disorder to seek help without fear of
negative consequences. At present, an individual who discovers
his attraction to children must keep the attraction secret;
disclosure could result in the loss of his job, educational
opportunities, housing, medical care, and other social and
economic opportunities protected by the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act. These consequences disincentivize individuals living with
pedophilic disorder from seeking treatment that could assist
them in refraining from illegal activities such as sexual assault or
the consumption of child pornography. Distinguishing pedophilic
disorder as undeserving of legal protections granted to other
mental illnesses also legitimizes the stigma of this mental illness
that keeps those suffering from it from seeking help.276
The nature of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
protections may also help prevent individuals from committing
criminal acts. In order to benefit from these civil rights
protections, an individual must identify as or be regarded as
having a disability. Such identification is inconsistent with the
tactics of a sexual predator, who relies on his sexual attraction to
children remaining secret.277 Individuals living with pedophilic
276. See Feierman, supra note 9, at 564 (describing stigma as discouraging
individuals from seeking help for pedophilia).
277. See Gladwell, supra note 86 (describing the strategies of sexual
predators).
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disorder will also be more likely to pass the direct threat test if
they provide evidence of treatment. Accommodations such as the
ability to attend therapy sessions or avoid contact with children
are similarly unconducive to sexual predation tactics. ADA and
Rehabilitation Act protection therefore alerts employers to an
individual’s disorder and encourages the individual to seek
accommodations to minimize any potential threat he or she poses
to others.
B. Civil Commitment Law
While anti-discrimination laws provide increased civil rights
protections for those living with mental disorders, civil
commitment laws allow the state to limit individual freedom
based in part on mental illness. Ordinarily, states can civilly
commit an individual under very limited circumstances. Part
IV.B argues that Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) statutes lower
the standard for civil commitment of people living with pedophilic
disorder and, in doing so, raise several potential conflicts with
important constitutional and criminal law principles. While it
often is valid to compromise the liberties of some in order to
protect the safety of others,278 a system that relies on
unwarranted assumptions and questionable science is a poor
means to accomplish this goal.
1. Civil Commitment: Justifications and Limitations
Until recently, civil commitment for mental health disorders
was quite limited. The Due Process Clause requires states
seeking to civilly commit an individual to demonstrate clear and
convincing evidence that the person is (1) mentally ill and
(2) dangerous to himself or others.279 While some individuals do
need long-term care, civil commitment generally focuses on
278. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 84 (noting that public interest can
outweigh an individual’s liberty interests).
279. See generally Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–84 (1992);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–32 (1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 574–76 (1975); Zander, supra note 18, at 18–19; Schulhofer, supra
note 18, at 70.
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providing care only as long as an individual poses a threat to
himself or others.280
The strict requirements of these laws reflect their basis in a
state’s police and parens patriae powers.281 A state’s parens
patriae powers allow it to stand in as guardian or protector for
those who are unable to protect themselves because they lack
capacity or competence.282 Involuntary civil commitment
generally applies to those who are not competent to make their
own decisions—unable to understand the consequences of their
actions as opposed to merely unwilling to abide by the law. By
standing in parens patriae to them, a state protects not only
society, but also the committed individual who cannot
appreciate or control his actions.283
These justifications are vital to the constitutionality of civil
commitment. The Supreme Court has held that civil
commitment is unconstitutional unless the individual has a
valid mental disorder; otherwise, it might be construed as
punishment for future crimes.284 The American Psychiatric
280. For example, many states’ SVP commitment laws contrast their longterm commitment with the short-term commitment goals of pre-existing civil
commitment statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.910 (2014); IOWA CODE § 229A.1
(2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014).
281. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under
its police power to protect the community from the dangerous
tendencies of some who are mentally ill.
See generally John Kip Cornwall, Understanding the Role of the Police and
Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After
Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 377, 377 (1998); Gottlieb, supra note 18,
at 1035; Zander, supra note 18, at 17.
282. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (discussing states’ parens patriae
powers); Cornwell, supra note 281, at 379–90 (discussing the history of parens
patriae authority over the mentally ill).
283. See Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make
Medical Treatment Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 561–62 (2012) (describing parens patriae power in the
context of civil commitment); Elizabeth A. Weeks, The Newly Found
“Compassion” For Sexually Violent Predators: Civil Commitment and the Right
to Treatment in the Wake of Kansas v. Hendricks, 32 GA. L. REV. 1261, 1274
(1998) (same).
284. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77–83 (requiring both mental illness and
dangerousness for commitment); Frances et al., supra note 111, at 377–78
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Association supports this limitation and recommends that civil
commitment be limited to persons who have a “severe mental
disorder” and “lack capacity to make a reasoned treatment
decision.”285 Many state civil commitment statutes imply that
psychosis, which entails some sort of loss of contact with reality,
is required for such commitment. 286 Prior to the 1990s, civil
commitment proceedings were almost exclusive to persons with
psychosis.287
Criminal law theory also limits the extent to which
individuals can be detained for offenses they could commit.
Retributivism, the dominant theory in criminal law, entails a
presumption of individual freedom and allows detention only
insofar that it is morally justified.288 It allows criminal
punishment of individuals only in accordance with their moral
desert.289 Retributivism does not condone the punishment of
(discussing the requirement of a mental abnormality coupled with
dangerousness as a predicate for civil commitment); Gottlieb, supra note 18, at
1037–38 (describing Foucha and the invalidity of preventive detention); Prentky
et al., supra note 168, at 359, 362 (“[I]t is the presence of a mental abnormality
that saves SVP laws from being unconstitutional preventive detention.”). Justice
White’s plurality opinion in Foucha required states to justify commitment with
clear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill and dangerous. See
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.3 (“[Psychiatric] opinion is reliable enough to permit
the courts to base civil commitments on clear and convincing medical
evidence . . . .”); see also Zander, supra note 18, at 30–32 (discussing Justice
White’s plurality opinion in Foucha). Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in
Foucha stated civil commitment requires “some medical justification,” or else
the connection between the nature and purposes of confinement would be
absent. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
285. Zander, supra note 18, at 19; see also Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1039
(describing how a Kansas statute limited civil commitment to individuals
detached from reality or unable to care for themselves).
286. See Zander, supra note 18, at 18–19 (detailing the major court decisions
that addressed the scope of a state’s power to civilly commit individuals).
287. Id. at 32.
288. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment:
Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 141, 149–51 (2011) (describing justifications for punishment under theories
of retributivism); Morse, supra note 18, at 58 (“For people who are dangerous
because they are disordered, the usual presumption in favor of maximum liberty
yields . . . .”).
289. See Henry M. Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
401, 412 (1958) (“[I]t is necessary . . . that the violation was blameworthy and,
hence, deserving of the moral condemnation of the community.”); Ferzan, supra
note 288, at 149; Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1033–34 (describing how criminal
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individuals who cannot understand or control their actions
because such individuals are not morally blameworthy.
Retributivism also rejects punishment based on purely preventive
grounds because it punishes those who have yet to act in a
morally blameworthy way.290 Such punishment does not accord
with retributivism’s respect for individual autonomy because it
fails to provide individuals the opportunity to choose to comply
with the law.291
Most criminal law scholarship distinguishes and justifies
civil commitment on the grounds that it is non-punitive.292 Civil
law gives the state the right to assign moral blame); Schulhofer, supra note 18,
at 80–83 (arguing criminal punishment can be only for voluntary acts and in
proportion to blameworthiness of those acts, and this cannot be trumped by
concerns about future dangerousness).
290. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 178, 183–84 (discussing preventive
interference under retributivism); Morse, supra note 18, at 58 (“There is no
‘pure’ prevention—the confinement of dangerous people without desert or
disease.”); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1439–41 (2001) (“[N]o
person deserves punishment before committing an offense.”); Schulhofer, supra
note 18, at 91 (arguing that to quarantine a diseased person in advance would
violate her autonomy if she could avoid transmitting the disease to others
through her conduct); see also R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 389 (1997)
(making similar arguments against criminalizing preparatory steps).
291. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 177–78 (discussing retributivism’s
objection that pure prevention fails to take people’s autonomy seriously); Morse,
supra note 18, at 57–58 (arguing that respect for autonomy constrains state
intervention to instances of desert or disease); Robinson, supra note 290, at
1434–41 (describing the conflict between punishment based on dangerousness
and punishment based on desert); Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 91 (arguing that
individuals are not responsible for harms that are not the result of chosen
actions).
292. See Morse, supra note 18, at 57–58 (“Such deprivations are forms of
greater or lesser quarantine and may include ‘treatment,’ but in theory they are
not punishment.”). There is debate among retributivist scholars about whether
detention based on predictions of dangerousness constitutes punishment. See,
e.g., id. at 58 (discussing the justification of non-punitive intervention for nonresponsible people); Robinson, supra note 290, at 1444–46 (discussing the
controversy surrounding the preventive detention legislation of the 1960s);
Ferzan, supra note 288, at 180–84 (examining the bases for interference in civil
and criminal contexts); Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention
as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1180–91 (2011) (arguing that
preventive detention constitutes punishment in some circumstances). Doug
Husak, for example, argues that civil commitment is punishment if it involves a
deprivation of freedom that the state intentionally uses to stigmatize an
individual. Husak, supra, at 1188–91. Husak would therefore classify SVP
commitment as punishment if the state has a punitive intention. See id. at
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commitment is limited to those who are unable to exercise their
autonomy.293 Retributivism, therefore, generally requires that the
state limit civil commitment to those who have mental illnesses
that significantly compromise their ability to choose to act in
accordance with the law.294 Failure to make this distinction could
result in the detention of individuals out of fear of the choices
they will make. As preventive detention, this would fail to respect
the individual’s autonomy to decide whether to commit an
1189–90 (noting that involuntary confinement of the dangerous mentally ill
differs from punishment because it lacks punitive intention). Husak argues,
however, that retributivism allows preventive punishment only when the state
demonstrates the individual has certain characteristics that make him pose
substantial danger of future harm. Id. at 1191–1202. SVP statutes do not meet
these criteria because they fail to require sufficient evidence that an individual
has a mental illness that creates a substantial risk they will commit a sex
offense, as discussed above. Husak also requires that the individual has control
over the relevant characteristics, which would preclude consideration of
pedophilic disorder. Id. at 1198–99 (“As long as we ensure that defendants have
control over these characteristics, they need not worry that they could not
possibly lose the status that rendered them eligible for liability in the first
place.”).
293. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1045 (discussing constitutionally
required justifications for civil commitment); Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert
Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 269–70 (1999) (“[A]gents incapable of
rationality do not actually have to cause harm to justify nonpunitive
intervention.”).
294. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 162 (arguing that preventive
interference is comparable to the elimination of an “Innocent Threat” in the selfdefense context); Morse, supra note 293, at 269–70 (comparing irrational agents
to other dangerous but irresponsible instrumentalities, including hurricanes,
microbes, and wild beasts). Civil commitment may be used in other
circumstances, such as quarantine. Such commitment is likewise considered
nonpunitive and limited to those unable to control whether they harm others. As
both Schulhofer and Gottlieb have noted, we ought not to civilly commit an
infectious individual who is able to control disease transmission purely on the
grounds that we fear he will not act responsibly. See Schulhofer, supra note 18,
at 91 (arguing that quarantining an infectious individual who can control
transmission of the disease would violate her autonomy as a responsible
person); Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1045–46 (arguing that the state may
quarantine infectious individuals because they may have no way of preventing
themselves from infecting others). We ought not to quarantine individuals with
HIV, for example, because they are able to control disease transmission. Such
quarantine would amount to preventive detention based on our fear about their
future choices and would not adequately respect their autonomy. See
Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 91 (“[I]f we simply fear that she may choose to
ignore the sanctions deployed to prevent such misconduct, then a decision to
quarantine her in advance is a decision to . . . violate her autonomy . . . .”).
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offense; as punishment, it would improperly punish an individual
who has not yet committed a culpable act.295
2. The Content of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
Laws
SVP laws use civil commitment to detain sex offenders from
society when they cannot be held by the criminal justice
system.296 For one who is convicted of an offense, civil
commitment occurs after the individual has served his prison
sentence.297 SVP law requirements vary by jurisdiction but share
common traits: (1) a connection with a sexual offense;298 (2) a
mental abnormality of some sort;299 (3) the mental abnormality
somehow predisposes the actor to commit sexual offenses;300 and
(4) the actor must have some threshold likelihood to offend if
released.301
The first requirement is that the individual usually must
have some connection with a sexual offense. Two things are
295. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 92–93 (“[A] free society should never
resort to regulatory confinement measures that bypass the individual’s capacity
for autonomous choice.”); Ferzan, supra note 288, at 177–78 (“[P]ure
prevention . . . fails to take people’s autonomy seriously, to announce rules, to
give individuals opportunities to comply, and to treat individuals as responsible
agents when we punish them.”).
296. See Jill S. Levenson, Policy Interventions Designed to Combat Sexual
Violence: Community Notification and Civil Commitment, in IDENTIFYING AND
TREATING SEX OFFENDERS: CURRENT APPROACHES, RESEARCH, AND TECHNIQUES,
17, 19 (Robert Geffner et al. eds., 2003) (describing that civil commitment
statutes are used to detain dangerous sex offenders who can no longer be held
by the criminal justice system); Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375, 376
(discussing the emergence of SVP civil commitment statutes in order to detain
dangerous offenders who would otherwise be released).
297. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375 (“Individuals identified as an
SVP/SDP are civilly committed for treatment in designated mental health
facilities after serving their prison terms.”).
298. See infra notes 302–307 and accompanying text (comparing how
different states define and treat the predicate sexual offense).
299. See infra notes 308–312 and accompanying text (comparing how
different states define the underlying mental disorder).
300. See infra notes 313–319 and accompanying text (comparing different
states’ requirements of predisposition to commit sexual offenses).
301. See infra notes 320–325 and accompanying text (comparing different
states’ requirements of likelihood to re-offend).
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notable about this requirement. First, the type of offense and its
connection to sexual violence can vary significantly. Some states
define a category of “sexually violent” offenses,302 while others
include any offense that a judge determines was sexually
violent.303 Second, conviction is not necessary in many
jurisdictions. Some states require that the individual was
convicted, found not guilty by reason of insanity, or deemed
incompetent to stand trial;304 others require only that the
individual was charged;305 and neither federal law nor Minnesota
require a formal charge.306 Some states also include minors
adjudicated delinquent.307
Several jurisdictions do not require a formal mental disorder
diagnosis. In Kansas v. Hendricks,308 the Supreme Court upheld
legislatures’ ability to define the parameters of a mental disorder
302. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (2014) (enumerating the
offenses included under the term “sexually violent offense”); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 207 / 5 (2014) (same).
303. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2014) (providing that
“sexually violent offense” means any offense which the court finds should be
considered a sexually violent offense); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014)
(providing that, in addition to certain enumerated offenses, “sexually violent
offense” means any offense which the court finds should be considered a
sexually violent offense).
304. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (defining “sexually violent
person”); WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (2014) (providing the definition of “sexually
violent person,” which requires that one have been convicted, adjudicated
delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent
offense).
305. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2(11) (2014) (providing the definition of
“sexually violent predator,” which requires that one has been convicted or
charged with a sexually violent offense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2014)
(providing that “sexually violent predator” means “any person who has been
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in repeat acts of sexual violence”).
306. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2012) (requiring only that the person
has “engaged or attempted to engage” in sexually violent conduct or child
molestation); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (requiring only that the individual
has engaged in “harmful sexual conduct”).
307. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2014) (providing the definition
of “sexually dangerous person,” which includes one who has been adjudicated as
a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6402 (2014) (providing a separate definition of “sexually violent
delinquent child”).
308. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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sufficient for SVP commitment without relying on psychiatric
terminology.309 Legislatures therefore drafted into SVP statutes
terms such as mental “abnormality,”310 mental “dysfunction,”311
and “behavioral abnormality.”312 The few that require a “mental
disorder,” usually define the term broadly to include “a congenital
or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity.”313
This mental disorder or abnormality must also undermine
the actor’s ability to control his sexually violent impulses. 314
Unlike ordinary civil commitment laws, SVP laws do not
require mental incapacity; they include individuals who are
able to understand their actions and their consequences. 315
Instead, SVP statutes rely on the concept that these
individuals are more predisposed to commit offenses because
they have more difficulty controlling their behavior.316
309. Id. at 358–60.
310. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (including “abnormality” in the
definition of “sexually dangerous to others”); FLA. STAT. § 394.912(5) (2014)
(defining “mental abnormality”); IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (same); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (same); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (same); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West
2014) (same); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03 (McKinney 2014) (same); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6402 (2014) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18) (2014)
(same).
311. See MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (including “dysfunction” in the
definition of “sexually dangerous person”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01 (2014)
(including “dysfunction” in the definition of “sexually dangerous individual”).
312. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a) (West 2013)
(including “behavioral abnormality” in the definition of “sexually violent
predator”).
313. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207 / 5 (2014) (defining “mental
disorder”); WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (2014) (same). Some states also use this or a
similar definition for mental abnormality. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014)
(defining “mental abnormality”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (same); MO.
REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (2014) (same).
314. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375 (detailing the criteria
necessary for categorizing an individual as an SVP).
315. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 541–43 (“[T]he SVP law model
represents gap-filling between desert and disease in which normal responsibility
rules for criminal versus civil control are blurred.”).
316. See id. (“[C]ognitive plus volitional impairments substantiate a
presumption of risk of future dangerousness and, in turn, are used by officials to
justify segregation and containment of sex offenders.”).
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In practice, states have often made this requirement quite
vague.317 Federal law requires that the mental disorder cause
“serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or
child molestation.” 318 Several jurisdictions require the mental
disorder “predispose the person to commit” acts of sexual
violence,319 with some specifying the predisposition must make
them a danger or menace “to the health and safety of
others.”320
Many jurisdictions also specifically require some likelihood to
engage in sexually violent acts in the future. This likelihood need
317. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 376–77 (arguing that most states’
definitions of the qualifying mental disorders for SVP laws are vague and
difficult to apply).
318. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2012); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014)
(requiring that the individual “find[] it difficult to control his predatory
behavior”).
319. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2014) (requiring a mental
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); FLA.
STAT. § 394.912(5) (2014) (requiring a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 207 / 5 (2014) (requiring a mental disorder that makes it
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence);
IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring a mental abnormality that makes the
person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (requiring a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (requiring a mental
abnormality that makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory
acts of sexual violence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2014) (requiring a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to
engage in acts of sexual violence); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18) (2014)
(requiring a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence); WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (2014)
(requiring a mental disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage in
one or more acts of sexual violence).
320. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(5) (2014) (requiring
predisposition to such a degree as to render the person a danger to the health
and safety of others); IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring predisposition to a
degree that would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2014) (same); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (same);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014) (requiring propensity to such a degree
that the person has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior as to pose a
potentially serious likelihood of danger to others); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.020(8) (2014) (requiring predisposition to commit criminal sexual acts in
a degree constituting such a person as a menace to the health and safety of
others).
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not be particularly strong. Most states require only that the
individual is “likely” to engage in acts of sexual violence.321 Some
jurisdictions require that the state show it is “more likely than
not” that the individual will commit a future act of sexual
violence.322 Other states define it as “such a degree as to pose a
menace to the health and safety of others.”323 New Hampshire
requires that “the person has serious difficulty in controlling his
or her behavior as to pose a potentially serious likelihood of
danger to others.”324 Others do not define “likely” at all.325
California, which does not define “likely” in the statute, instructs
321. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2014) (requiring that the
person is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); FLA. STAT. § 394.912(5)
(2014) (same); IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring that the person will, more
likely than not, engage in acts of a sexually violent nature); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a02 (2014) (requiring that the person is likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2014) (requiring the person be
likely to engage in sexual offenses); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (requiring that
the person is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014) (requiring that the person pose a potentially serious
likelihood of danger to others); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2014) (requiring that
the person will, more likely than not, engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2014) (requiring that the person is
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03 (McKinney
2014) (requiring that the person is likely to be a danger to others and to commit
sex offenses); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014) (requiring that the person is
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 841.003(a) (2013) (requiring that the person is likely to engage in a predatory
act of sexual violence); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014) (requiring that the
person is so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he constitutes a
menace to the health and safety of others).
322. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014) (requiring that the person will,
more likely than not, engage in acts of a sexually violent nature); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 632.480 (2014) (requiring that the person will, more likely than not, engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence); WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (2014) (requiring that the
person will, more likely than not, engage in one or more acts of sexual violence).
323. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.912(4) (2014) (requiring propensity of such a
degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§59-29a02 (2014) (requiring propensity of such a degree as to pose a menace to
the health and safety of others); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2014) (same); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (2014) (requiring that the person pose a threat to the
health and safety of others); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (2014) (requiring that
the person pose a menace to the health and safety of others).
324. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (2014).
325. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2014) (omitting “likely” as a
statutorily defined term); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02 (2014) (same); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. § 10.03 (2014) (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a)
(2013) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2014) (same).
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jurors that the term “does not mean that it must be more
probable than not that there will be an instance of reoffending.”326
3. Implications for Pedophilic Disorder
SVP statutes do not apply to every individual living with
pedophilic disorder, nor do they apply exclusively to those with
pedophilic disorder. An individual living with pedophilic disorder
usually does not fall within the purview of the SVP statute unless
he is suspected of committing an offense, generally either a
sexually violent or sexually motivated offense.327 These
individuals also need not be diagnosed with pedophilic disorder to
be subject to civil commitment under SVP statutes. Other
diagnoses, such as antisocial personality disorder, may support
SVP civil commitment.
Despite these caveats, this Article addresses SVP civil
commitment because pedophilic disorder is a major predictor of
SVP commitment.328 Pedophilic disorder is one of the—if not
the—most common diagnosis in support of SVP commitment.329 A
326. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 2014) (omitting
“likely” as a statutorily defined term); CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 4.19 (defining
“likely” for juries in the context of deciding commitment of an alleged sexually
violent predator).
327. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (noting that those who
sexually abuse children are not exclusively those who are classified as
pedophilic, but are a wide-ranging group); Zander, supra note 18, at 36
(discussing the prevalence of paraphilia diagnoses among those committed
under SVP statutes); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 553–54 (discussing the
statistical correlation between paraphilia diagnosis and civil commitment).
328. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (describing the correlation
between pedophilic disorder and civil commitment); Zander, supra note 18, at 36
(describing the statistical connection between pedophilia diagnosis and civil
commitment); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 553–54 (examining statistically the
role diagnoses of sexual deviance play in imposing preventive detention).
329. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (“[Pedophilia] is the most
common diagnosis in civil commitment procedures . . . .”); Zander, supra note 18,
at 36 (“Pedophilia . . . is one of the most frequently made diagnoses in SVP
cases.”); Hamilton, supra note 18, at 553–54 (“The strong influence of the
paraphilias in committal proceedings is consistently shown by statistical
analyses.”). The vast majority of civil commitments rely on a diagnosis of
pedophilic disorder or hebephilic disorder. Hebephilia is an intense sexual
interest in young adolescents, and is often confused with pedophilia. At present,
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diagnosis of pedophilic disorder raises the odds of civil
commitment by approximately 4,500%; it has an even higher
correlation with a recommendation for civil commitment than an
individual’s statement that he intends to commit a new sex
crime.330 Courts often rely on pedophilic disorder as de facto
evidence that the individual’s volitional control is compromised or
that he is likely to re-offend.331
Taken as a whole, SVP statutes expand the state’s power to
civilly commit, and do so in a way that has especially severe
repercussions for individuals living with pedophilic disorder. The
consequences of SVP statutes for individuals living with
pedophilic disorder are even more severe given the statutes’
scopes. Most statutes do not require a criminal conviction, and
the federal statute does not require an arrest. Moreover, unlike
ordinary civil commitment, SVP statutes are specifically drafted
to ensure long-term detention.332 Some states explicitly cite the
the American Psychiatric Association does not recognize hebephilic disorder in
the DSM-V. See DSM-V, supra note 39 (omitting hebephilia from the recognized
mental disorders). However, SVP civil commitment proceedings often cite the
general category of unspecified paraphilias, arguing that hebephilia is an
unspecified paraphilia. See Zander, supra note 18, at 36 (“[T]he paraphilias are
commonly the diagnostic basis for the mental abnormality or mental disorder
that is alleged as part of SVP commitment proceedings.”).
330. See Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of
Sexually Violent Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY
& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 609, 622 tbl.3 (2006) (providing data on the effect of
pedophilia diagnosis on the odds of civil commitment); see also Hamilton, supra
note 18, at 554 (“Pedophilia was also highly correlated and had a statistical
effect greater even than the number of previous victims or the individual’s
statement of intent to commit a new sex crime.”).
331. See, e.g., Shindel & Moser, supra note 128, at 927 (stating that
paraphilia diagnoses have been misused in criminal and civil commitment
proceedings as indication that individuals cannot control their behavior);
Hamilton, supra note 18, at 554–55 (describing cases in which pedophilia was
analogized to lifelong addiction); Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034,
1040–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (referring to expert testimony that defendant was
likely to re-offend because pedophilia was incurable, lifelong disorder); United
States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, 336–37 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing expert
testimony that the defendant was likely to re-offend because of pedophilia
diagnosis); In re Kennedy, 578 S.E.2d 27, 29 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (finding
pedophilia diagnosis alone sufficient to demonstrate sufficient likelihood of reoffending).
332. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600–6609.3 (West 2014) (providing that
a determination of danger to the health and safety of others does not require
proof of a recent overt act while the offender is in custody); FLA. STAT. § 394.910
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need to avoid using ordinary civil commitment proceedings,
which are “primarily designed to provide short-term treatment to
individuals with serious mental disorders and then return them
to the community.”333 Permanent detention might in fact be the
goal of such statutes.334 Several states’ legislative findings state
that the prognosis for curing sexually violent offenders is poor,
suggesting doubt about rehabilitating those offenders.335
4. Rethinking Sexually Violent Predator Statutes
SVP statutes contain an interesting mix of requirements.
They provide for civil commitment of individuals who understand
their actions but nonetheless have a mental disorder that affects
their ability to control their behavior. The rationale of the statute
therefore relies heavily on the state’s ability to distinguish
individuals who have some sort of volitional impairment that
makes them so dangerous that detention is warranted.
The concept of volitional impairment is central to the
constitutionality of SVP laws. In Kansas v. Crane,336 the Court
held that the statutory requirements for SVP commitment must
be able to distinguish those who have a mental abnormality that
makes them dangerous from the ordinary criminal.337 To this end,
it required that statutes show a degree of volitional
impairment.338 The Crane Court held that states need not show
that individuals it seeks to commit have complete inability to
(2014) (“It is . . . the intent of the Legislature to create a civil commitment
procedure for the long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators.”);
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014) (“The legislature further finds that
the . . . treatment needs of this population are very long term . . . .”).
333. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014).
334. Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375 (noting that civil commitment
occurs after serving one’s prison term and lasts for an indefinite period).
335. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 75 (discussing legislative findings in
the Washington statute).
336. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
337. See id. at 412–13 (recognizing that lack of control must be sufficiently
proven to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender from the dangerous, but
typical, recidivist); Zander, supra note 18, at 30–31 (discussing the holding in
Crane).
338. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (rejecting commitment without any lack-ofcontrol determination).
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control their actions; indeed, the Court questioned whether this
was even possible.339 But the Court required that states
demonstrate that individuals show “serious difficulty” in
refraining from sexually violent behavior.340
Yet SVP statutes, and the Crane decision that upheld them,
rely on questionable assumptions about the psychology of those
living with pedophilic disorder and other mental disorders. At
present, the concept of volitional impairment is highly
questionable in both law and psychiatry.341 Psychiatric literature
is rife with ambiguity and uncertainty about the concept of
volitional impairment and self-control in general, and with
concerns about its use in SVP proceedings.342
For these reasons, the APA cautions against assuming
impaired impulse control from a psychiatric diagnosis for the
sake of legal proceedings.343 We should question whether the
concept is sufficiently able to distinguish individuals with
behaviors, preferences, or sexual orientations from those who are
truly mentally ill. This is particularly true given that SVP
commitment proceedings often rely on conclusions about
volitional impairment that lack a proper evidentiary basis or that
misconstrue the psychiatric literature.344 Members of the
psychiatric community have cited these concerns to argue that
339. See id. at 411–12 (finding no requirement of total or complete lack of
control); Frances et al., supra note 111, at 377–78 (discussing the Court’s
decisions in Crane and Hendricks).
340. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412–13 (“It is enough to say that there must be
proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”); Prentky et al., supra note
168, at 362–63 (discussing the holding in Crane).
341. See Prentky et al., supra note 168, at 363 (“[I]t is problematic, and
perhaps impossible, to distinguish between impulses that are irresistible and
impulses that simply are not resisted.”); Zander, supra note 18, at 65–66
(examining the issues in determining volitional impairment in paraphilia cases).
342. See Zander, supra note 18, at 65–66 (“[N]one of the paraphilias require
any type of volitional impairment or inability to control impulses to make a
diagnosis.”); Prentky et al., supra note 168, at 363–64 (“The volitional
dysfunction standard as applied in insanity defenses is rarely appropriate in the
SVP context.”).
343. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 25 (cautioning the use of DSM-V
diagnostic criteria when making legal decisions); Morse, supra note 18, at 64–65
(discussing the problems inherent in measuring lack of control); Frances et al.,
supra note 111, at 379 (discussing use of the DSM in forensic settings).
344. See Morse, supra note 18, at 64–65 (discussing the problems inherent in
measuring lack of control).
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SVP laws inappropriately use psychiatry to promote preventive
detention of those deemed deviant.345
Pedophilic disorder in particular is often used to determine
volitional impairment. SVP commitment proceedings often use
pedophilia and other paraphilia diagnoses as de facto evidence
that the individual lacks volitional control.346 Yet psychiatric
research has not demonstrated that paraphilic disorders are
associated with volitional impairment or impulse control.347 For
this reason, the DSM does not list impulse control as a symptom
of pedophilic disorder or other paraphilic disorders.348 Research
has also questioned the relationship between pedophilic disorder
and long-term recidivism.349
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that courts
routinely fail to require appropriate evidence of volitional
impairment. Most states allow courts to assume the actor has
difficulty controlling his actions from the defendant’s mental
disorder and his past acts. 350 This practice essentially allows
courts to conflate pedophilic disorder and other paraphilic
disorders with volitional control, a presumption that is not
supported by scientific evidence. 351
345. See Frances et al., supra note 111, at 375–76 (describing the
shortcomings of SVP definitions applied broadly by state statutes).
346. See supra note 331 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ reliance
on pedophilia diagnoses as evidence of likelihood to re-offend).
347. See supra Part II.B (discussing the characteristics of paraphilic
disorders).
348. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 697–99 (providing a description of
pedophilic disorder and omitting impulse control as a symptom).
349. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (citing research that found
a pedophilic diagnosis was unrelated to long-term recidivism).
350. See Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane’s “Serious Difficulty”
Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L. REV. 291, 300–01 (2004) (arguing that
Arizona, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin fail to require a separate finding of lack of control);
Janine Pierson, Comment, Construing Crane: Examining How State Courts
Have Applied Its Lack-of-Control Standard, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1527, 1537–46
(2012) (arguing that ten states do not require a separate showing of lack of
control, and either ignore the requirement or inappropriately conflate it with
the mental abnormality requirement).
351. See Michael B. First & Robert L. Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia
Diagnoses in Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 450 (2008) (describing the distinction between diagnosis of
paraphilia and volitional impairment). Courts’ willingness to assume volitional
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SVP statutes therefore create a system in which
individuals living with pedophilic disorder may be detained
indefinitely based on questionable constitutional grounds. The
problems inherent in the concept of volitional impairment
undermine the requirement’s ability to accurately distinguish
a group of individuals who merit civil commitment. Moreover,
state courts have weakened the requirement, further
undermining its validity in civil commitment proceedings.
SVP statutes allow civil commitment of individuals who are
able to understand and control their actions based on fear of
the decisions they will make. 352 This undermines the
justifications central to the constitutionality of civil
commitment. 353
SVP statutes also conflict with criminal law theory. As
discussed above, the dominant theory of retributivism requires
that the state limit civil commitment to individuals who are
unable to act in accordance with the law.354 SVP statutes use
mental illness to civilly commit individuals who can rationally
choose their behavior. An individual in the throes of sexual
interest does not act on reflex. He feels an interest, forms an
intent, and acts on it.355 Refusing to engage in the sexual activity
impairment, despite lack of evidence, may in fact be tied to the disgust
pedophilic disorder instills. Historically, the determination that a sexual urge
creates an impulse control problem has been linked to whether the underlying
interest is considered acceptable. It was at one time commonly accepted that
individuals could suffer from “compulsive homosexuality” and “compulsive
masturbation” because same-sex attraction and masturbation were in
themselves viewed as problematic. See Moser, supra note 125, at 323
(“[C]ompulsive masturbators and compulsive homosexuals began to disappear
once those behaviors were no longer seen as signs or symptoms of
psychopathology.”); Moser, supra note 110, at 92 (detailing the history of and
problems with paraphilia as a concept). Similarly, courts may be presuming that
individuals with sexual interest in children must lack control over their actions.
352. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1037, 1045 (arguing that preventive
detention of sane individuals is not constitutional); Schulhofer, supra note 18,
94–95 (arguing that SVP commitments should be impermissible without proof of
mental illness).
353. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1037–38, 1045 (arguing that there are
constitutional limits to how far criminal and civil sanctions may overlap).
354. See supra notes 292–295 and accompanying text (detailing how
retributivism applies to civil commitment).
355. See Morse, supra note 18, at 63 (examining how desire and control
influence action and responsibility).
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might be more difficult for an individual who desires it than for
an individual who does not in that the former will suffer from
frustration, tension, or loneliness. But these negative
consequences do not prevent the individual from controlling his
actions.356 Indeed, it is for this very reason that we hold such
individuals responsible for their actions and deny them an
insanity defense; criminal law expects the individual to suffer the
negative effects and holds him responsible if he does not.357
The above difficulties with SVP statutes may seem small in
the larger context of preventing sex offenses. But a deprivation of
liberty—particularly one so complete and indefinite as civil
commitment—should not be undertaken lightly.358 It should not
allow for the detention of those whose mental disorders might
simply predispose them to choose to commit offenses.359
Otherwise, states may use civil law to circumvent constitutional
limits on criminal law.360 We must also take care not to detain
people based on assumptions with questionable scientific merit,
even with the best of intentions.
If we take pedophilic disorder seriously as a mental disorder,
then we must think critically about what it is and what it is not.
As reviled as individuals with pedophilic disorder may be, and as
horrific as the offenses of many individuals chosen for SVP civil
commitment are, SVP laws still merit scrutiny. Disgust does not
justify the state’s ability to indefinitely detain based on
356. See id. (“[A] desire is simply a desire . . . there is no literal physical
compulsion, as there is in cases of reflex, spasm and the like.”).
357. See id. (“Even if the yielding conduct is the symptom of a recognized
disorder, agents who yield in such circumstances appear quintessentially
responsible for their conduct . . . .”). We might, potentially, excuse the action
based on the idea that the discomfort in not acting is too much for an individual
to bear. But such an excuse would be, as Morse notes, a “non-culpable hard
choice” similar to duress rather than a lack of control or volition. See id. at 64
(discussing potential loss of control as a result of compulsion or duress).
358. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 541 (arguing SVP statutes are a human
rights issue because civil commitment infringes on liberty and privacy).
359. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1045 (arguing that the state must show
why civilly committed individuals differ from other criminals who commit sex
crimes); Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 94–95.
360. See Gottlieb, supra note 18, at 1035 (“If the government may simply
recast its criminal proceedings as civil, it may be able to accomplish the goals it
might otherwise achieve only through punishment by a simple change in
nomenclature.”).
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questionable assumptions and scant evidence. Undoubtedly, SVP
statutes civilly commit many terrible people who have done and
will do abhorrent things. But the SVP system inappropriately
uses mental illness—and in particular pedophilic disorder—to
justify preventive detention in a way that is inconsistent with
constitutional and retributivist principles.
This is not to say that constitutional and criminal law
principles foreclose any civil commitment to prevent violent
sexual offenses. There are two potential alternatives to achieve
these goals. The first is to limit SVP civil commitment to
individuals who are truly not competent to choose whether to
abide by the law, as the law ordinarily does for the civil
commitment of those who are mentally ill and dangerous.361 If
such individuals have the capacity to choose whether to violate
the law, the state may not detain them indefinitely. For those
convicted of an offense, the state may impose probation and other
limitations on their freedom after release, but the state may not
use civil commitment to keep them in custody where criminal law
cannot.
A second alternative would be to consider models of
preventive detention that rely on dangerousness and not mental
disorder. Criminal law theorists have proposed several potential
justifications for very limited detention of individuals who intend
to commit offenses, analogizing it to self-defense.362 Current SVP
361. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 94–96 (“Preventive incapacitation of
[individuals who are capable of choosing to act and responding to sanctions], as
a substitute for reliance on the criminal process, is inconsistent with the core
commitments of a free society . . . .”).
362. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, for example, uses a self-defense analogy to
argue that states have a limited right to detain individuals who intend to
commit an offense. Ferzan, supra note 288, at 162–63. Stephen Morse similarly
uses a self-defense analogy to argue that preventive detention might be
justifiable if predictive technology could accurately determine whether an
individual will offend. Morse, supra note 18, at 69; Morse, supra note 293, at
295. Michael Louis Corrado argues that the state can restrain individuals to
prevent the crimes of those who intend to commit them and have begun to make
an effort to commit the offense. See Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the
Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 778, 790 (1996) (“Setting aside the question of preventive
detention for the moment, punitive restraint in the case of ongoing efforts to
break the law would seem to be as well justified as punishment for past
crimes.”). Scholars differ on whether these detentions are punitive, preventive,
or some combination of the two. See Husak, supra note 292, at 1180–91 (arguing
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statutes rely on mental illness while undermining the parens
patriae justification that makes mental illness relevant to civil
commitment. These proposed systems of preventive detention
rely instead on predicting when an individual intends to commit
an offense and intervening beforehand.363 Because of its lack of
mental disorder requirement, it is not clear where such a system
would fit in with Supreme Court precedent requiring a disease
justification for civil commitments based on dangerousness.364
These proposed means of detention also require a strong showing
that the individual will commit an offense.365

punitive under some circumstances); Corrado, supra, at 790 (arguing punitive);
Morse, supra note 18, at 58 (arguing preventive); Ferzan, supra note 288, at
180–84 (arguing somewhat punitive and somewhat preventive).
363. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at 162 (“This structure has a natural
application to preventive interference by the State. The aggressor is a
responsible agent. He performs an act in furtherance of a culpable intention.
And, based on that act, it becomes permissible to stop him.”); Corrado, supra
note 362, at 790 (“If the state could never detain except for a crime committed,
then the state could not intervene to prevent an ongoing attempt to harm. It
seems clear that in some circumstances the state has the moral authority to do
just that.”). This is not to say mental disorders would be irrelevant. An
individual’s pedophilic disorder could be evidence of an individual’s intent to
commit an offense.
364. See Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–84 (1992) (concluding that a
person may be held without violating their due process rights so long as they are
both mentally ill and dangerous); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–32
(1979) (“[T]he State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they
are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others.”);
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574–76 (1975) (considering and rejecting
reasons for detention in the absence of dangerousness and mental illness).
365. One reason for this is the view that a self-defense-like theory is needed
to justify detention based on prediction of future crimes; it is a narrow exception
for the state to intervene to prevent a crime. Thus, the showing should not rely
on the general characteristics of the individual. See Ferzan, supra note 288, at
173, 179 (“Importantly, what justifies the State’s interference is not a general
prediction based on facts about the actor, but what the actor has done.”). Rather,
the state should be able to demonstrate at the very least that the individual has
the intent to commit an offense. See id. at 167–69 (explaining intent as an
element in justifying state interference). Other potential requirements include
an act in furtherance of the offense. See id. (describing the benefits of the
evidentiary requirement of an act for the state to intervene). But see Husak,
supra note 292, at 1194–97 (arguing against an act requirement). These
proposals stand in stark contrast to current SVP statutes, which generally
require only a likelihood of offending and rely on general characteristics such as
the individual’s mental disorder.
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V. Conclusion
A. Implications for Other Areas of Law and Policy
1. Public Health
As with any mental disorder, the public needs public health
interventions that identify and treat pedophilia early. Currently,
states offer treatment programs for people with pedophilia that
are sex offenders, but there are no outreach efforts and no largescale treatment or research programs that focus on early
identification and the prevention of sexual abuse before an
individual commits an offense.366 State intervention is almost
exclusively limited to those in its custody or those who are on
restricted conditions of release.367
From a public health perspective, this approach is absurd. It
would be likewise irrational for public health policy to ignore
depression until it manifests in suicidal behavior or drug abuse,
or to ignore schizophrenia until it manifests in a violent episode.
Public health authorities recognize that early identification and
intervention provide better prognoses for mental disorders, which
is in part why public health authorities, such as the National
Institute for Mental Health (NIMH), spend hundreds of millions
of dollars studying and treating these disorders, and in particular
on programs with preventive focuses.368 In contrast, NIMH funds
no programs addressing the treatment of pedophilia, much less
the early identification and treatment of individuals before they
offend.369 Our lack of focus on early identification and
intervention squanders important opportunities to prevent child
sexual abuse. Experts argue that the best means of preventing

366.
367.
368.

Interview with Michael Seto (Sept. 25, 2014).
Id.
See FY 2014 Budget Congressional Justification, NAT’L INST. MENTAL
HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/budget/fy-2014-budget-congressionaljustification.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (identifying hundreds of millions
of dollars allocated in NIMH’s budget to treat and prevent mental health
disorders through programs, research grants and other uses) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
369. Interview with Erin Patricia Shannon, Acting Budget Officer, NIMH
(Sept. 29, 2014).
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child abuse is to focus on treatment before an individual commits
the offense and enters the criminal justice system.370
Limiting treatment and research to pedophiles that are sex
offenders severely restricts our ability to study the effects of
treatment. Studies of sex-offender treatment are commonly
focused on the issue of recidivism and whether treatment
successfully prevents re-offenses.371 This creates several
problems. Recidivism is a common problem in U.S. prisons among
all types of offenders, with sex offenses proving to be no
exception. Several variables determine an individual’s likelihood
of re-offending for any offense, including employment stability,
housing, and community support.372 All offenders face obstacles
in these areas, but such problems are particularly stark for sex
offenders due to registration requirements and housing
limitations.373 Focusing on recidivism among sex offenders
therefore restricts research to a group of pedophiles with myriad
intervening variables and for which treatment faces the most
obstacles.
Limiting research to sex offenders and recidivism also
prevents us from studying the myriad other important effects
treatment may have. For example, it forecloses the study of
370. Interview with Michael Seto (Sept. 25, 2014).
371. See sources cited supra note 73.
372. Recidivism of Sex Offenders, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT. (May
2001), http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015)
(reviewing studies on sex offender recidivism) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY CITY-COUNTY COUNCIL REENTRY POLICY STUDY COMMISSION, RE-ENTRY POLICY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT
(2013), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/research/recidivism_and_reentr
y/; JOCELYN FONTAINE ET AL., SUPPORTIVE HOUSING FOR RETURNING PRISONERS:
OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF THE RETURNING HOME—OHIO PILOT PROJECT, URBAN
INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY CTR. (2012); Paul Heroux, Sex Offenders: Recidivism,
Re-Entry Policy and Facts, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011 3:41 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-heroux/sex-offenders-recidivism_b_976765.
html (last updated Jan. 8, 2012 5:12 AM) (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
373. See Joseph Goldstein, Housing Restrictions Keep Sex Offenders in
Prison Beyond Release Dates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/08/22/nyregion/with-new-limits-on-where-they-can-go-sex-offen
ders-are-held-after-serving-sentences.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015)
(describing the challenges sex offenders within New York face in finding
housing that conforms to the requirements of sex offender registration) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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treatment’s effects on those who have never offended or have
never been in the criminal justice system. It also limits our
ability to study how variables common to offending affect the
success of treatment. This deprives us of information key to
preventing child sexual abuse and to helping individuals living
with pedophilia live law-abiding and productive lives.
2. Criminal Law
Careful consideration of pedophilia as a mental disorder has
implications for criminal law, but would be unlikely to result in
significant change. This is in large part because pedophilic
disorder does not implicate culpability in a way that concerns
criminal law. Individuals living with pedophilic disorder would be
unlikely to argue successfully that they are not guilty by reason
of mental defect or insanity. Nor does pedophilic disorder raise
concerns about criminalization of the sexual abuse of children.
Careful consideration of pedophilic disorder may, however, be
cause to reexamine its use in sentencing.
Insanity defenses have undergone substantial changes over
the past century.374 Until a few decades ago, several insanity
defenses incorporated a notion of both cognitive impairment and
volitional impairment.375 Mental disorders provided a defense to a
crime based on either a lack of rational capacity—for example, an
inability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions—or a
volitional impairment such that the accused was unable to
control his actions.376 In the mid-1980s, Congress and several
states, with the support of the American Psychiatric Association,

374. See MOORE, supra note 111, at 218–32 (describing the rise and fall of
the volitional test in the 1980s following a number of political episodes involving
mental illness, like the shooting of President Reagan); Michael Louis Corrado,
Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 60–62 (2005) (explaining the
development and popularity of various tests, namely volitional and cognitive, for
determining insanity for the purpose of criminal defenses since the 1950s).
375. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
376. See Prentky et al., supra note 168, at 363–64 (“In some states, criminal
acts may be excused on proof of irresistible impulses or an impairment in ability
to conform one’s behavior to the law when caused by mental illness
(psychosis).”).
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abolished the volitional impairment criteria.377 The majority of
states now rely purely on cognitive impairment.378
Pedophilic disorder is rarely used as an insanity defense, and
rethinking its place in the law should not affect this. Pedophilic
disorder is, in itself, unlikely to provide an insanity defense under
either the cognitive or volitional impairment criteria. A
pedophilic disorder diagnosis is based on sexual attraction and
either behavior, distress, or impairment.379 It requires no
cognitive impairment, nor do any of these criteria imply an
inability to understand the nature or wrongfulness of one’s
actions. Nor does a pedophilic disorder diagnosis either require or
imply an inability to control one’s actions.
Careful consideration of pedophilic disorder also provides
little reason to question the criminalization of sex with children
or the production, dissemination, and possession of child
pornography. It is true that individuals living with pedophilic
disorder have urges to engage in these illegal activities. But the
fact that some individuals, by nature of their biology, may desire
to engage in unlawful activity is not in itself reason to make the
activity lawful. On the contrary, there are ample reasons to
criminalize child sexual abuse and child pornography offenses.
Such offenses harm other individuals and deserve punishment
when done with a culpable mental state.
One concern of criminal law that may merit reconsideration
is pedophilic disorder’s role in sentencing. Mental disorders are
often mitigating factors in sentencing.380 Judges consider an
377. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience
and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 85 (2006)
(“The popularity of control tests began to wane by the 1970s, and grew even
more unpopular in the wake of John Hinckley’s acquittal, under the Model
Penal Code standard, for the shooting of President Reagan in 1981. . . . Most
states, as well as the federal courts, use only a cognitive test for insanity.”).
378. See Corrado, supra note 374, at 61 & nn.16–17 (“By my survey, thirty
states, in 1980, had two-prong insanity rules, with both cognitive and volitional
prongs: only eighteen still had the older one-prong test. By 2004, only fifteen
states still had the two-prong test, and thirty had the one-prong, purely
cognitive test.”).
379. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text (describing the APA’s
three criteria for pedophilic disorder).
380. See Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 907, 945 (2011) (describing mental illness as a
mitigating factor); Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating
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individual’s mental disorder as reducing his moral culpability on
the basis that it impaired his ability to act in accordance with the
law. These individuals are sufficiently sane to be responsible for
their actions and therefore do not merit an insanity defense.
Nonetheless, judges often consider mental illness when
determining how much punishment the individual deserves.381
On the contrary, courts use pedophilic disorder to justify
lengthier sentences or to justify the decision to incarcerate over
less restrictive options.382 In contrast to other mental disorders,
pathologizing pedophilic disorder seems to have exacerbated
perceptions that such individuals are monsters incapable of
empathy or self-control.383 Pedophilic disorder may even provoke
more sentencing than other types of sexual disorders; in State v.
Lottie,384 for example, a judge justified his imposition of a harsher

Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296–98 & nn.44–46
(1989) (same).
381. See Morse, supra note 380, at 945 (“It is universally accepted that
mental disorder is a mitigating factor, and many jurisdictions specifically list
mental abnormality as a mitigating factor, using language similar to the Model
Penal Code's ‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance’ criterion or a similar
partial responsibility standard.”); Berkman, supra note 380, at 296–98 & nn.44–
46 (“Numerous state legislatures and courts have concluded that certain mental
and emotional states may constitute mitigating factors.”).
382. See, e.g., United States v. Mantanes, 632 F.3d 372, 375–76 (7th Cir.
2011) (basing sentencing in part on conclusion that defendant was a “pedophile
with continuing urges”); State v. Lottie, No. 93050, 2010 WL 2333052, at *1–3
(Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2010) (“The judge then found that Lottie was not
amenable to community control sanctions and that ‘[t]his type of crime calls for
a prison sentence.’”); see also Hamilton, supra note 18, at 537–38 & nn.10–12
(outlining cases). In Lottie, there does not appear to be a formal diagnosis of
pedophilic disorder. The sentencing judge seems to have concluded that the
defendant had pedophilia based on the defendant’s solicitation of young girls
and the fact that, in the judge’s words, “Your girlfriend looks pretty young in the
back sitting next to your mom, as well.” Lottie, 2010 WL 2333052, at *1–2.
383. See Malón, supra note 9, at 1092
On the contrary, this diagnosis and especially its
management by professionals or lay persons could be having
in general the effect of reinforcing the image of these men as
dangerous slaves of their own libido, without the capacity
for love, lacking any empathic feeling for children, and
incapable of managing their condition in a socially
acceptable way.
384. No. 93050, 2010 WL 2333052 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2010).
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sentence by distinguishing the defendant’s pedophilic disorder
from mere sex addiction.385
Courts use pedophilic disorder to extend sentencing based on
concerns about protection and deterrence, not based on
blameworthiness.386 An individual living with pedophilic disorder
arguably has an inherent motive to re-offend against children
that might make him more difficult to deter from offending.387
Thus, courts may extend the sentence of individuals living with
pedophilic disorder in order to protect the public from a recidivist.
Reconceptualizing pedophilia in the law requires us to
reexamine the extent to which extended sentencing is justified. It
is not clear that pedophilic disorder merits different treatment
than other mental disorders in the context of sentencing.
Recidivism for sex offenses is, contrary to popular belief, lower
than for other offenses.388 Some studies report that offenders
living with pedophilic disorder are more likely to re-offend than
those who do not live with pedophilic disorder;389 others have
demonstrated no relationship between pedophilic disorder and
long-term recidivism.390 It is also difficult to accurately measure
385. See id. at *1–2 (quoting the trial court judge as stating, “I think what
you are missing the point with, though, is that it’s not just sex addiction, it’s
pedophilia. That it’s clear from your actions that you targeted young girls.”).
386. There is nothing more inherently blameworthy about an individual
with pedophilic disorder who sexually abuses a child out of sexual desire than
an individual without pedophilic disorder who sexually abuses a child out of a
desire to humiliate or dominate a child. It is even possible that the former is less
blameworthy than the latter, just as crimes of passion may be considered less
blameworthy than cold-blooded ones.
387. See, e.g., United States v. Boroczk, 705 F.3d 616, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing concerns about greater recidivism due to pedophilia).
388. See Levenson, supra note 296, at 22 (explaining that a study that is
often believed to show high recidivism rates “did not in fact conclude that sex
offender treatment is futile, but that due to the methodological inadequacies of
the studies they examined, they were unable to find a statistically significant
treatment effect on recidivism”).
389. See Strassberg et al., supra note 35, at 379 (“Increasingly, there is
empirical evidence that these two groups of sexual offenders against children
differ in a number of important ways. For example, compared to non-pedophiles,
pedophiles tend to have more victims, respond more poorly to treatment, and
are more likely to reoffend.” (citations omitted)); Levenson, supra note 296, at 21
(discussing a variety of studies which have been interpreted to show high
recidivism rates for pedophilic sex offenders).
390. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 529 (citing studies concluding
that a pedophilic diagnosis is unrelated to long-term recidivism); Robin J.
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recidivism given that it often relies on either self-report or
criminal conviction. 391 One thing that is clear is that pedophilic
disorder does not necessarily indicate recidivist tendencies;
several variables specific to the individual are important in
calculating an individual’s likelihood to reoffend.392 It is
worthwhile to balance these considerations—as well as the need
for additional research—when considering whether pedophilic
disorder is an appropriate consideration for extending sentencing.
The use of pedophilic disorder to extend sentencing is also
relevant to more general debates about using recidivism (or
predictions of recidivism) to extend sentencing, a controversy that
is beyond the scope of this Article.393
It is also worth reflecting on the role that disgust plays in
extending the sentences of sex offenders because of a pedophilic
disorder diagnosis. In Martha Nussbaum’s work on disgust and
the law, she distinguishes indignation, defined as imputing blame
on a person because of their wrongful behavior, from disgust,
defined as distancing an object as less human.394 Sex offenses
against children elicit legitimate indignation, which recognizes
individuals as responsible moral agents. But extended sentences
Wilson et al., Pedophilia: An Evaluation of Diagnostic and Risk Prediction
Methods, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 260, 268–70 (2011) (“However, individuals who met
DSM-IV-TR-based diagnoses of pedophilia were no more likely to be convicted of
a new sexual offence than those who failed to meet the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic
criteria for pedophilia . . . .”); Heather M. Moulden et al., Recidivism in
Pedophiles: An Investigation Using Different Diagnostic Methods, 20 J. FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 680, 693 (2009) (“The results suggest that those
individuals diagnosed as pedophiles do not recidivate more often or more quickly
than non-pedophiles.”); see also Hamilton, supra note 18, at 579–80 (“Nor is a
DSM diagnosis of pedophilia correlated with sexual recidivism. Actually, a study
using a regression analysis method indicates that a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia
is not even a significant predictor for sexual recidivism.”).
391. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 533 (“Recidivism is a term with many
definitions, which affect reported rates of repeated offenses. For example, some
studies look at additional arrests for any offense, others only look at arrests for
sexual crimes, and some only look at convictions, whereas others analyze selfreported reoffenses.”).
392. See id. (explaining the impact of variables like sexuality and antisocial
personality traits on recidivism rates).
393. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING
COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 3 (2008) (describing the “normative
dilemmas” that accompany recidivist sentencing premiums).
394. NUSSBAUM, supra note 227.
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for offenders diagnosed with pedophilic disorder may instead
reflect disgust, a judgment that such individuals are inhuman
monsters. Nussbaum has noted a similar effect where prosecutors
seeking the death penalty in murder cases appeal “to a type of
disgust that places the murderer in a class of heinous monsters
more or less outside the boundaries of the jury’s moral
universe.”395
Courts should exercise caution when tapping the emotion of
disgust for the purposes of punishment. Disgust is, in some ways,
more comforting than indignation. It creates a boundary between
us and the objects of our disgust.396 But using disgust to
distinguish those living with pedophilic disorder may be in
tension with the decision to hold the defendant responsible as a
moral agent.397 Even the most horrific abusers of children are not,
in fact, monsters—they are human beings who have done terrible
things with no justification or excuse. Disgust only clouds our
ability to punish the individual as a moral agent.398
3. Constitutional Law and Sexual Freedom
Reconsidering pedophilic disorder in the law should not raise
concerns about constitutional protections for child abuse. In the
last two decades, the Supreme Court has issued landmark
decisions protecting the rights of sexual minorities to engage in
relationships. These decisions, however, rely on foundations that
are inapplicable to pedophilic disorder and child sexual abuse.
In 2003, the Supreme Court’s landmark Lawrence v. Texas
decision struck down a state sodomy law.399 Its decision argued
that criminalizing sexual conduct that is intrinsic to the identity
of a marginalized group—in particular, gay men—affects the
395. Id. at 65–66.
396. See id. (“Disgust is all about putting the object at a distance and
drawing boundaries.”).
397. See id. (“Indignation works in the opposite direction: by imputing blame
to its object, and by focusing on the wrongful nature of the person’s act, it
presupposes the ascription of humanity and responsibility.”).
398. See id. at 165–68 (arguing that using disgust as a tool to distance
oneself from others limits jurors’ ability to critically evaluate the moral
culpability of defendants).
399. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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group’s full participation in society.400 Lawrence did not entirely
prohibit states from criminalizing such sexual conduct; it
required states to demonstrate a rational basis for such laws
beyond “the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral . . . .”401
Laws prohibiting the sexual abuse of children clearly have
such a basis. Sexual abuse significantly harms children.402 It
poses both physical and psychological harms, and is de facto
harmful because such children lack capacity to give consent.403
Thus, even if criminalizing sex with children could be viewed as
denying those with pedophilic disorder relationships intrinsic to
their identity, such concerns are far outweighed by the need to
protect children from harm. For these reasons, Lawrence
implicitly rejected any attempt to apply its reasoning to the
sexual abuse of children by distinguishing gay sexual
relationships from those involving minors or “persons who might
be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where
consent might not easily be refused.”404
4. Mandatory Reporting Laws
All fifty states have laws requiring health care practitioners
to report suspected child abuse to authorities.405 Such statutes
require psychologists to report suspicions of past, present, or
future sexual abuse of a child based on disclosures by the

400. See id. at 575–79 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny
by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in [homosexual
sex] . . . .”).
401. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
402. See supra note 28 (discussing the long-term psychological harms to
children as a result of child-sexual relations, including trauma, neurosis, and
depression).
403. See id. (discussing the incapability of a child to give reasoned consent).
404. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
405. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2014), http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_polici
es/statutes/manda.pdf; Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 467, 468.
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potential victim, perpetrator, or any party.406 An individual living
with pedophilic disorder who consults a psychiatrist out of fear
that he might offend may therefore trigger disclosure
requirements.407
These statutes must balance the critical need to prevent child
abuse and to treat individuals who have been abused with the
need to ensure confidentiality in health care.408 Non-offending
individuals with pedophilic disorder avoid seeking treatment out
of fear that psychiatrists will report them to authorities, resulting
in the loss of their jobs and families.409 There is also evidence that
these statutes deter sex offenders from seeking psychiatric help

406. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §17a–101a (2014) (explaining that
“mandated reporters” who in the ordinary course of their employment have
reasonable cause to suspect or believe that any child under the age of eighteen
has been abused or neglected has a duty to report or cause a report to be made
to the authorities); Gross v. Myers, 748 P.2d 459 (Mont. 1987) (applying a
similar mandate in Montana); see also Schwartz, supra note 19 (“Studying the
disorder is complicated by the fact that, in the U.S., laws that went into effect in
the 1990s require therapists and physicians to report to child protective services
(and other authorities that vary by state) anyone they believe poses a threat to a
child.”).
407. See Dreger, supra note 7 (“Many jurisdictions have passed mandatory
reporting regulations for psychologists and other health care providers.
Consequently, when someone who thinks he might be a pedophile comes in for
counseling or therapy, the psychologist may be compelled by law to report the
person to the authorities.”); Schwartz, supra note 19 (“Since reporting a
potential pedophile results in legal action, the law has deterred many
pedophiles from voluntarily seeking psychiatric help—which troubles some
researchers, since the disorder can be easier to prevent than treat.”).
408. See Schwartz, supra note 19 (“[I]t can be easy to forget that pedophilia
is a mental illness, and that legally, it only becomes a crime when acted upon.
Yet the key to preventing and treating the disorder may lie in its clinical
details.”).
409. See Hall & Hall, supra note 28, at 468–69 (“The opponents of [Megan’s
Law and related laws] argue that, because of the laws, pedophiles will
intentionally avoid treatment and not register because of fear (1) for their
physical safety, (2) for their family’s safety, and (3) of not being able to obtain
housing and employment.”); Dreger, supra note 7 (“[P]sychologist[s] may be
compelled by law to report [people with pedophilia] to the authorities. . . .
[T]hese people have simply stopped coming in at all, and instead of getting help
to them, we now have pedophiles circulating in society receiving no support at
all.”); Clark-Flory, supra note 3 (“[V]ery few pedophiles will voluntarily out
themselves, given the stigma; and due to mandatory reporting rules, which are
open to interpretation, non-offending pedophiles can reasonably fear being
reported to the police.”); Bleyer, supra note 4 (same).
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to avoid re-offending.410 When Maryland passed a strict
mandatory reporting law, the Johns Hopkins Sexual Offenders
Clinic saw the identification of new offenses committed by the
treated population decrease from 21% to 0%, with no increase in
the number of abused children identified.411
Germany’s Prevention Project Dunkelfeld, discussed above,
provides an example of treatment and outreach that mandatory
reporting laws prevent. The project’s success is dependent on
Germany’s lack of mandatory reporting law, a fact featured on
the front page of its website.412 The lack of mandatory reporting
has allowed the project to reach individuals who have either not
offended but fear they may, or who have offended but have never
been caught.413 Not only does this expand access to treatment,
but it has also allowed the project to gain additional insight on
groups that usually elude researchers. The Project has since
produced research on pedophilia itself and on creating public
outreach campaigns to encourage individuals living with
pedophilic disorder to seek treatment.414
410. See Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists to
Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449, 451
(1991) (showing that the number of self-reporting pedophiles in Maryland
plummeted to and remained at zero after disclosure laws were passed); Hall &
Hall, supra note 28, at 468–69 (“In 1988, Maryland required that all abuse that
occurred during treatment be reported. This law caused the identification of new
offenses committed by the population being treated at the Johns Hopkins Sexual
Offenders Clinic to decrease from 21% to 0%.”). These studies were not limited
to sex offenders living with pedophilic disorder, but there is no reason to believe
that the laws would have a less significant chilling effect for those living with
pedophilia.
411. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
412. PREVENTION PROJECT DUNKELFELD, https://www.dont-offend.org/ (last
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
413. See Beier et al., supra note 77, at 4 (“[U]p to 45% of the present sample
of self-identified pedophiles and hebephiles could be encouraged to participate in
clinical diagnostics, even though they were not mandated to seek treatment.
The majority of these men (66%) indeed met the diagnostic criteria of pedophilia
and/or hebephilia.”).
414. See Janina Neutze et al., Predictors of Child Pornography Offenses and
Child Sexual Abuse in a Community Sample of Pedophiles and Hebephiles, 23
SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 212, 230–34 (2011) (describing the benefits
of research afforded by increased self-reporting, including the proposition “that
factors identified in research with detected child sexual abuse and child
pornography offenders may not generalize to undetected offenders”); Beier et al.,
supra note 77, at 1–4 (describing the benefits to research caused by increased
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Additional reflection on pedophilic disorder could contribute
to the discussion of how legal standards can best balance
concerns about encouraging preventive therapy with concerns
about ensuring abused children are helped and sex offenders
identified. It could also help develop legal standards that better
enable health care providers to determine when they should
report an individual living with pedophilic disorder who has not
disclosed any offense. The identification and prevention of abuse
are important public policy goals. Lawmakers must balance the
efficacy of mandatory reporting statutes in achieving these goals
with the potential obstacles they pose to treating pedophilia and
preventing additional abuse.
B. Implications for Other Paraphilias
Further reflection on the legal meaning and consequences of
pedophilic disorder has consequences for other paraphilias. First,
this reflection helps us determine how to best conceptualize other
paraphilias in the law. Second, the above discussion of pedophilic
disorder raises relevant concerns for other paraphilias that are
best conceptualized as mental disorders under the law.
Although this Article argues that mental disorders provide a
better rubric for the legal issues pedophilia raises, this conclusion
is not warranted for every paraphilia. For example, fetishism
(sexual interest in objects) may be better conceptualized as a
sexual orientation than a mental disorder.415 The argument that
fetishism, which does not involve harm to another human being,
constitutes a dysfunction is far weaker than for pedophilia.416
participation in studies and the efficacy of various types of media campaigns);
Klaus M. Beier et al., Can Pedophiles Be Reached for Primary Prevention of
Child Sexual Abuse? First Results of the Berlin Prevention Project Dunkelfeld, 20
J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 851, 865 (2009) (explaining the potential of
media campaigns as preventive measures vis-à-vis child sexual abuse).
415. See Beech & Harkins, supra note 39, at 531 (defining fetishism).
416. See Odd Reiersol & Sven Skeid, The ICD Diagnoses of Fetishism and
Sadomasochism, 50 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 243, 248 (2006) (“If a person has an
uncontrollable urge to do something that violates a partner’s personal
boundaries, or has an uncontrollable urge to do something that causes harm to
himself or herself, these are issues that must be addressed.”); Susan Wright,
Depathologizing Consensual Sexual Sadism, Sexual Masochism, Transvestic
Fetishism, and Fetishism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1229 (2010) (discussing
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Similar arguments could be made for transvestitism, which the
DSM continues to categorize as a paraphilia.417
Other paraphilias are better conceptualized as mental
disorders for the purposes of legal analysis. For these sexual
disorders, the disability discrimination analysis above may
provide a strong argument for their inclusion in the ADA and
other anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, among paraphilias,
pedophilia likely inspires the most concerns about inclusion in
anti-discrimination law because of the nature of the threats such
sexual desires pose. Other paraphilias will likely be far easier to
justify as disabilities entitled to civil rights protections.
C. Final Thoughts
This Article begins, but does not resolve, a much larger
discussion of how the law should conceptualize and approach
pedophilia. It argues for a more reasoned and coherent concept of
pedophilia. It further argues that the law should incorporate this
concept in a way that is more consistent with important legal
principles.
Advances in this topic have significant implications for
several areas of law. It is vital to understand sexual attraction to
children in order to prevent child sexual abuse. At present, our
laws and policies often isolate individuals with pedophilia from
resources that prevent abuse, exacerbating public health and
criminal law problems. The rights of individuals with pedophilia,
however, are in themselves an appropriate concern for the law.
We should not ignore inconsistent or unjust laws simply because
they only affect those who provoke revulsion.
Lawmakers, courts, and scholars must continue to reexamine this topic as our understanding of pedophilia evolves.
Further reflection is vital to improve both the laws that address
the policy problems with conflating sexual behaviors with mental disorders and
the questions which much be answered to distinguish the two, like determining
the meaning and boundaries of “significant distress”).
417. See DSM-V, supra note 39, at 700–04 (listing the wearing of clothing
usually worn by another gender as evidence of “fetishistic disorder”); Beech &
Harkins, supra note 39, at 530–31 (“The most common fetishistic targets of this
paraphilia are female underwear, feet, and shoes.”).
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pedophilia and the lives of the individuals and communities these
laws affect.

